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IS IT WRONG TO ALLOW IDEOLOGY to pervade political decisions on software procurement, or is it 
inevitable that governments profess a particular conception of the good with respect to every aspect of 
societal life? This article advances a normative framework, based upon a broad conception of the democratic 
principle, to advocate that Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) be adopted and have its development 
encouraged and carried out by democratic governments. More than an aspiration, formal and substantial 
reasons ground the understanding advocated in this article that striving towards comprehensive FLOSS 
policies is a duty of every state that purports to be a democratic one. After a brief introduction of my 
propositions in Part 1, and a conceptualization of FLOSS in Part 2, Part 3 describes different governmental 
FLOSS policies around the world. These policies, I show, are often based upon normative values that, beyond 
stereotypes, would be better assessed within a thorough conception of the democratic principle. Part 4 
portrays the Brazilian government’s particular history of expressly linking FLOSS policies to the democratic 
principle. Part 5 analyzes different dimensions of the democratic principle in the information age. Part 5 
begins by conceptualizing the democratic principle in light of its relation with technology, in general, and 
FLOSS, in particular, and then evaluates the importance of FLOSS for the fulfillment of cultural, ethical, 
political, and economic dimensions of the democratic principle. In Part 6, the article concludes with a 
particular understanding of the commitment assumed in the Tunis round of the World Summit on the 
Information Society and reinforces this vision of the deontological character of governmental policies 
towards FLOSS.
EST-IL pRéjuDIcIAbLE DE pERmETTRE à uN IDéOLOGIE d’influencer des décisions de nature politique en 
matière d'approvisionnement de logiciels, ou est-il inévitable que les gouvernements professent une 
conception particulière de ce qui est juste en ce qui concerne tous les aspects de la vie sociale ? Dans cet 
article, on propose un cadre normatif, fondé sur une vaste conception du principe démocratique, à l’effet de 
revendiquer l’adoption du Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) et d’autoriser les gouvernements 
démocratiques à encourager son développement et son application. Plus qu’une simple aspiration, des 
raisons officielles et profondes étayent la thèse défendue dans cet article en vertu de laquelle des politiques 
exhaustives concernant le FLOSS sont une nécessité pour tous les États qui se targuent d’être une 
démocratie. Après une brève introduction de mes propositions dans la Partie 1, et une conceptualisation de 
FLOSS dans la Partie 2, la Partie 3 décrit différentes politiques gouvernementales d’application de FLOSS à 
l’échelle mondiale. Comme je le démontre, ces politiques sont fondées sur des valeurs normatives qui, 
au-delà des stéréotypes, feraient l’objet d’une meilleure évaluation dans le cadre d’une conception 
approfondie du principe démocratique. La Partie 4 dresse le portrait de l’histoire particulière du 
gouvernement brésilien qui a adopté des politiques relatives au FLOSS explicitement reliées au principe 
démocratique. La Partie 5 analyse les différentes dimensions du principe démocratique en cette ère de 
l’information. La Partie 5 commence avec la conceptualisation du principe démocratique à la lumière de ses 
liens avec la technologie, en général, et avec le FLOSS, en particulier, et évalue ensuite l’importance du 
FLOSS pour la réalisation des dimensions culturelles, éthiques, politiques et économiques du principe 
démocratique. Dans la Partie 6, l’article conclut par la vision particulière de l’engagement adopté lors de la 
ronde de négociations du Sommet mondial sur la société de l'information à Tunis et renforce cette vision du 
caractère déontologique des politiques gouvernementales à l’égard du FLOSS.  
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1. SOFTWAre, BureAuCrACIeS, AnD DeMOCrACIeS
It Is not the aIm of thIs artIcle	to	portray	any	objective	and	groundbreaking	
evidence	 in	 support	 of	 open	 source1	 policies.	 in	 effect,	my	 intent	 here	 is	 not	
merely	descriptive	but	normative.	in	the	lines	that	follow	i	seek	to	explain	why	
software	is	not	just	software	and,	more	specifically,	what	software	has	to	do	with	
democracy.	i	am	indeed	convinced	that	there	is	more	nurturing	the	semiological	
fabric	and	the	underlying	informational	infrastructure	that	keeps	our	governments	
operating	 than	procurement	processes’	measurements	of	 efficiency.	economic	
savings	with	open	 source	 adoption	 can,	of	 course,	be	an	 important	 factor	 for	
policymaking,	and	there	are	several	studies	addressing	the	economic	reasons	as	
to	why	governments	should	go	(and	are	going)	open	source.2	But	what	i	fiercely	
believe	is	that	a	holistic	framework	for	justifying	a	public	policy	should	look	not	
only	 into	 numbers	 and	 practicalities	 but,	 more	 importantly,	 their	 reason	 for	
being,	 namely	 people.	 indeed,	 only	 by	 looking	 into	 people,	more	 specifically	
citizens	and	the	dynamics	of	social	groups,	and	understanding	the	impacts	of	a	
public	 policy	 upon	 them	 will	 government	 officials	 depart	 the	 gray	 area	 that	
sometimes	seems	to	exist	between	serving	the	state	and	serving	society.	and	it	
is	 precisely	 here	 that	 government	 officials	 will	 cease	 to	 be	 bureaucrats	 and	
become	democrats.
1.	 For	the	sake	of	fluidity,	I	will	refer	to	free	software	and	open	source	software	and	their	movements	
interchangeably	Each	movement,	however,	has	a	completely	different	set	of	principles,	and	rather	
antagonistic	ideologies,	that	diverge	in	different	measures	from	the	traditional	model	of	licensing	computer	
programs	to	which	they	improperly	refer	as	the	“proprietary”	regime—improperly	in	the	sense	that	neither	
the	free	software	movement	nor	the	open	source	movement	relies	upon	a	system	other	than	intellectual	
property	law,	and,	more	precisely,	copyright	law	to	achieve	their	ultimate	goals.	In	this	sense,	both	are	also	
proprietary	in	the	end.	Both	use	the	intellectual	property	framework	to	create	a	license	(the	former)	or	a	
definition	(the	latter)	which	is	based	on	the	legal	concepts	of	authorship	and	ownership	to	establish	a	
cyberspace	of	wider	rights	within	the	restrictive	default	of	prohibitions	defined	in	copyright	acts	and	
international	intellectual	property	conventions.	Please	see	discussion	of	differences	in	Section	2	below,	for	
an	analysis	of	their	ideological	differences.
2.	 See,	for	example,	Canada,	Treasury	Board	of	Canada	Secretariat,	Chief	Information	Officer	Branch,	“Free	
and	Open	Source	Software:	Overview	and	Preliminary	Guidelines	for	the	Government	of	Canada,”	(26	April	
2005),	<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fap-paf/oss-ll/foss-llo/foss-llotb-eng.asp>.
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	 indeed,	 those	who	 take	 this	 last	 approach	 for	 analyzing	 open	 source	
policies	will	be	less	resistant	to,	and	less	skeptical	about,	a	democratic	justification	
for	 the	 governmental	 development,	 use	 and	 encouragement	 of	 open	 source	
software.	it	is	certainly	an	argument	drenched	in	ideology	to	say	that	adopting	
a	 model	 of	 open	 development	 and	 licensing	 of	 computer	 programs	 is	 more	
democratic	 than	 embracing	 the	 opposite	 one.	 But,	 as	 democracy	 is	 itself	 an	
ideological	concept,	to	say	that	we	should	get	rid	of	ideology	when	establishing	
a	public	policy	would	imply	that	we	should	also	get	rid	of	any	metaphysical	ideas	
which	 pullulate	 in	 the	 immaterial	 universe	 of	 democracy.	 fortunately,	 in	 the	
struggles	 throughout	 the	 centuries	 in	 the	western	 hemisphere	between	 those	
who	want	to	keep	a	sometimes	unjustified	and	other	times	disproportional model	
of	privilege	and	control	of	 societal	 institutions	and	 those	who	want	 society	at	
large	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 decisions	 that	 define	 people’s	 sources	 of	meaning	
and	experience,	 the	 latter	group	has	been	 triumphing.	and	 the	victories	have	
hardly	ever	been	based	simply	on	quantifiable	numbers,	but	mostly	on	values	and	
principles	that	in	a	given	moment	perturbed	the	social	glue.	
	 Brought	to	the	international	stage,	the	conflicts	between	those	who	decide	
and	those	who	are	decided	upon	do	not	always	rely	simply	on	mensurable and	
definable	factors.	fundamentalist	and	emulative	 logics	are	reflected	in	 internally	
inconsistent	recommendations	from	the	(developed)	countries	which	have	taken	
charge	of	 telling	 the	others	what	 they	 should	do.	Thus,	 it	 is	not	 surprising	 that	
those	opposing	the	recommendations	of	developed	countries	very	often	stand	on	
the	same	ideological	footing.	as	ha-Joon	chang	reveals	in	his	 insightful	Kicking 
Away the Ladder,	“[t]here	is	currently	great	pressure	on	developing	countries	from	
the	developed	world,	and	the	international	development	policy	establishment	that	
it	controls,	to	adopt	a	set	of	‘good	policies’	and	‘good	institutions’	to	foster	their	
economic	development.”	But	“[h]ow	did	the	rich	countries	really	become	rich?	The	
short	answer	to	this	question	is	that	the	developed	countries	did	not	get	where	
they	are	now	 through	 the	policies	and	 the	 institutions	 that	 they	 recommend	 to	
developing	countries	today.”3	
The	 attempts	 of	 developed	 countries	 to	 show	 how	 some	 diverging	
ones are	 failing	 the	 test	 of	 sanity	 by	 relying	 upon	 ideological	 values	 that	 do	
not	correspond	 to	 the	“status	quo”	are	not	very	different	 from	 the	marketing	
strategies	 of	 “capitalistically	motivated	 and	 ideologically	 inclined”4	 owners	 of	
intellectual	monopolies	that	try	to	paint	free	software	communities	as	irrational	
followers	of	a	marginal	praxis.	
	 This	is	certainly	not	what	free	software	groups	are.	as	Berkeley	economist	
and	 sociologist	 Manuel	 castells	 very	 accurately	 pointed	 out	 in	 his	 speech	 at	
3.	 Ha-Joon	Chang,	Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem	Press,	
2002)	at	pp.	1–2.
4.	 Eben	Moglen,	“‘Die	Gedanken	Sind	Frei’:	Free	Software	and	the	Struggle	for	Free	Thought,”	Opening	
keynote	presentation	at	Wizards of OS 3: The Future of the Digital Commons (Berlin,	10–12	June	2004),	
<http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/berlin-keynote.html>:
	 The	struggle	for	freedom	of	thought	 is	as	old	as	European	politics	and	it	underlies	
who	all	of	us	are	today.	It	exists	in	relation	to	a	long-standing	struggle	against	various	
forms	of	control	of	thought	each	characteristic	of	the	political	and	economic	moment	
in	 which	 they	 temporarily	 triumphed.	 Whether	 it	 is	 the	 control	 of	 education	 and	
publication	by	the	universal	Catholic	church,	the	control	of	printing	and	censorship	of	
learning	 by	 state	 power	 or	 the	 control	 of	 knowledge	 and	 culture	 by	 owners,	
capitalistically	 motivated	 and	 ideologically	 inclined—we	 have	 been	 struggling	
against	power	for	the	freedom	of	thought	for	a	millennium.
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the	world	Social	forum	of	2005,	“Open	Source	 is not a fantasy or a marginal 
practice.	 very	 large,	 and	 very	 important	 software	 development	 projects	 have	
resulted	from	an	open	source	process	of	production.”	By	open	source	we	should	
comprehend	a	new	“form	of	social	organization	of	production	that	originated	in	
the	development	of	computer	software,	and	 […]	 is	mainly	concerned	with	 the	
open	access	to	the	knowledge	of	the	source	code	of	a	software	program.”5	as	
will	be	discussed,	such	a	form	is	not	exclusive	to	the	open	source	movement.	it	
is	important	to	point	out,	as	castells	notes,	that	open	source	can	be	seen	“as	a	
social	phenomenon,	a	political	phenomenon,	and	an	economic	phenomenon.”6	
in	 this	 article	 i	 add	 that,	 fourthly,	 open	 source	 is	 also	 a	 cultural	 phenomenon	
and	show	that	all	those	phenomena	spread	through	a	new	technological	model	
which	reflexively	nourishes	and	is	nourished	by	them.	i	am	convinced	that	each	
of	 those	dimensions	has	 an	 important	 implication	 for	 the	development	of	 the	
democratic	principle,	and	that,	in	turn,	makes	the	free	software	movement	worth	
being	taken	 into	consideration	by	any	country	 that	purports	 to	be	democratic	
when	it	is	establishing	a	public	policy	for	software.
i	 would	 go	 a	 bit	 further	 still.	 More	 than	 worth	 being	 taken	 into	
consideration,	 i	 believe	 that	 the	 free	 software	movement	 definitely	 asks	 for	 a	
new	definition	of	the	way	a	state	acquires	and	encourages	the	development	of	
software	 in	a	democratic	country.	 in	 this	 sense,	and	 this	 is	 the	precise	 idea	of	
this	paper,	 i	will	defend	 the	argument	 that	 the	democratic	 implications	of	 the	
free	software	models	of	licensing	must	be	observed	in	any	process	for	acquiring	
computer	programs	and	also	stimulated	by	governmental	actions	aimed	towards	
the	development	of	the	software	sector.	To	reach	this	conclusion,	i	will	consider	
each	of	the	phenomena	referred	to	by	castells	as	different	conceptions	of	the	
democratic	principle	and	examine	the	adequacy	of	several	preferential	regimes	
for	free	software	that	have	been	adopted	by	democratic	states.	
	 as	 i	 have	 already	 hinted	 in	 this	 introduction,	 only	 in	 very	 exceptional	
situations	can	governments	avoid	migrating	towards	free	software;	for	instance,	
this	may	be	temporarily	justified	when	an	insurmountable	legacy	prevents	a	more	
intense	process	of	migration.	Only	in	anomalous	situations,	when	higher	harms	
for	the	public	interest	may	arise	as	a	consequence,	would	it	be	understandable	
that	 governments	might	 defer	 or	 slow	 down	 their	migration	 processes.	what	
is	not	to	any	extent	permissible is	the	persistence	of	the	odd situation	in	which	
private	parties	tell	governments	how	they	should	contract.	it	is	quite	enigmatic	
why	 in	 traditional	 public	 procurement	 processes	 governments	 decide	 under	
which	clauses	they	should	lease	a	building	or	hire	a	service,	but	when	it	comes	to	
software	a	small	group	of	major	companies	set	the	proper	“public”	framework	
through	“end	User	 License	agreements.”	That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 few,	who	do	not	
represent	the	interest	of	the	many,	decide	for	the	state	which	rights	it	shall	have	
and	deny	many	freedoms	that	would	better	support	the	democratic	principle.
	 The	 following	section	begins	our	venture	 in	 this	article	by	providing	a	
more	nuanced	conceptualization	of	free	software	and	its	variants.	it	explains	the	
contours	of	different	models	of	 licensing	and	development	that,	as	 just	noted,	
5.	 Manuel	Castells,	“Innovation,	Information	Technology	and	the	Culture	of	Freedom,” presentation	at	the	
World Social Forum	(Porto	Alegre,	26–31	January	2005),	<http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/2623.
html>	(emphasis	added).
6.	 Castells,	“Innovation,	Information	Technology	and	the	Culture	of	Freedom,”	supra	note	5.
84  university of ottawa	law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
better	 support	 the	 democratic	 principle.	 in	 section	 5	 i	 more	 deeply	 examine	
several	dimensions	of	such	principle	and	develop	a	more	robust	conceptualization	
of	 it,	but	perhaps	a	quick	note	 is	due	here	 to	 introduce	our	 further	 reference	
to	 it.	 Two	 issues	are	 important	 to	notice	 in	 this	 sense.	first,	 i	will	 refer	 to	 the	
principle	 in	 the	 singular	 –	 as	 the	 democratic	 principle.	 	 as	much	 as	 one	may	
find	many	different	ideas	grouped	under	the	umbrella	of	democratic	theory,7	the	
same	happens	with	the	democratic	principle	–	as	it	actually	does	with	regard	to	
any	principle.	as	noted	by	Dworkin,	“we	make	a	case	for	a	principle,	and	for	its	
weight,	by	appealing	 to	an	amalgam	of	practice	and	other	principles	 in	which	
the	 implications	of	 legislative	 and	 judicial	 history	 figure	 along	with	 appeals	 to	
community	practices	and	understandings.”8	Principles	are	an	integral	part	of	our	
complex	normative	order;	the	orientations,	the	reasons	for	action	they	provide	us	
with	hang	together	in	a	system	that	reflects	and	responds	to	that	which	charles	
Taylor	has	termed	a	“space	of	questions.”9	The	democratic	principle,	however,	
has	a	differentiated	weight	in	this	interconnected,	normative	web.	it	is	a	central	
node	around	which	many	other	criteria	or,	 if	you	 like,	sub-principles	revolve.	 if	
we	 focus	on	democracy	as	a	process,	 for	 instance,	we	may	agree	with	robert	
Dahl	 that	 democracy	 demands	 effective	 participation,	 voting	 equality	 at	 the	
decisive	 stage,	 equal	 opportunities	 for	 discovering	 and	 validating	 choices	 on	
matters	being	decided	and	the	opportunity	to	control	the	agenda	of	matters	to	
be	decided.10	what	precisely	 those	criteria	encompass	 is	of	more	problematic	
definition	as,	 in	 a	much	grander	 scale,	 the	 very	 idea	of	 “rule	by	 the	people,”	
the	literal	understanding	of	democracy,	is.	however,	as	much	as	we	can	ascribe	
some	normative	 force	 to	each	of	Dahl’s	 criteria	 for	procedural	democracy,	we	
can	also	do	so	with	regard	to	their	more	general	organization	under	the	idea	of	
an	overarching	democratic	principle.	 it	 is	 such	an	 idea,	which	 is	wider	 than	 its	
topical	procedural,	institutional	or	other	perspectives	(e.g.	technological),	that	i	
will	be	further	referring	to	in	this	article	as	the democratic	principle,	and	which	i	
will	be	addressing	from	various	societal	dimensions	with	regard	to	free	models	of	
software	licensing.
all	 this	 can	 perhaps	 be	 summarized	 by	 saying	 that	 the	 democratic	
principle	demands	that	states	and	citizens	conduct	themselves	according	to	the	
requirements	of	 a	democratic	 regime.	Democracy,	empirically	 considered,	 is	 a	
concept	steeped	in	the	variations	of	cultural	relativism	–	i.e.	as	a	sheer	matter	of	
fact,	it	may	or	may	not	be	adopted,	without	any	moral	repercussions.	economies	
may	 thrive	 in	 its	 spite;	 societies	 may	 take	 pride	 on	 their	 different,	 long-held	
traditions.		however,	for	states	where	all	the	members	of	the	demos	are	deemed	
to	be	equally	qualified	a	general	normative	standard	ensues	which	provides	that	
7.	 See	Robert	A.	Dahl,	Democracy and its Critics	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1989)	at	p.	7:	“I	like	to	
think	of	democratic	theory	as	if	it	were	like	a	very	large	three-dimensional	web.	Much	too	large	to	take	in	at	
a	single	glance,	the	web	is	constructed	of	interconnected	strands	of	different	elasticities.”
8.	 Ronald	Dworkin,	Taking Rights Seriously	(London:	Duckworth,	[1977]	2005)	at	p.	36.
9.	 Charles	Taylor,	Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	
1992)	at	p.	29:	“[T]o	speak	of	orientation	is	to	presuppose	a	space-analogue	within	which	one	finds	one’s	
way.	To	understand	our	predicament	in	terms	of	finding	or	losing	orientation	in	moral	space	is	to	take	the	
space	which	our	framework	seeks	to	define	as	ontologically	basic.	The	issue	is,	through	what	framework-
definitions	can	I	find	my	bearing	in	it?	In	other	words,	we	take	as	basic	that	the	human	agent	exists	in	a	
space	of	questions.	And	these	are	the	questions	to	which	our	framework-definitions	are	answers,	providing	
the	horizon	within	which	we	know	where	we	stand,	and	what	meanings	things	have	for	us.”
10.	 Dahl,	Democracy and its Critics,	supra	note	7	at	pp.	108-114.
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the	“good	of	each	member	is	entitled	to	equal	consideration.”11	in	Dahl’s	words,	
“[i]f	all	the	members	are	judged	equally	qualified,	in	the	full	sense,	and	if	the	other	
conditions	 set	 out	 earlier	 are	 held	 to	 exist	 among	 them,	 then	 the	procedures	
according	to	which	these	persons,	the	citizens,	make	binding	decisions	ought	to	
be	evaluated	according	to	the	...	criteria	[that	define	a	full	democratic	process].”	
The	second	issue	which	is	thus	important	to	notice	here	is	that,	however	different	
the	normative	character	of	principles	may	be	in	relation	to	that	of	rules,	principles	
also	 provide	 standards,	 reasons	 for	 action.	 a	 principle,	 Dworkin	 explains,	 is	
“a	standard	that	 is	 to	be	observed	 ...	because	 it	 is	a	 requirement	of	 justice	or	
fairness	or	some	other	dimension	of	morality.”	for	states	that	have	entrenched	
the	democratic	principle	in	their	constitutional	traditions	this	is	ever	more	true.	
hence,	if	democratic	criteria	can	be	furthered	by	the	adoption	of	free	or	open	
source	software,	the	democratic	principle	provides	reasons	that	that	be	so.	we	
now	turn	to	understand	the	object	of	such	wider	democratic	possibilities.	
*
2. COnCePTuALIzIng Free/LIBre OPen SOurCe SOFTWAre (FLOSS)
the free software and open source movements	share	the	same	goal:	 they	
prescribe	that	the	source	code	of	a	computer	program—the	preferred	form	that	
a	programmer	uses	 to	modify	 the	program—shall	be	accessible	 for	 users	 and	
new	 developers.	 The	movements	 permit	 licensors	 (intellectual	 property	 rights	
holders)	 to	 charge	 for	 initial	 access	 to	 the	 program	 or	 its	 source	 code,	 but	
prohibit	licensors	from	preventing	further	uses	of	both,	including	modifications	
and	derivative	works.	That	is	to	say,	licensors	shall	not	require	a	payment	for	the	
license	per se,	but	only	for	additional	services	or	facilities	that	they	or	others	may	
render	with	respect	to	the	licensed	software.	Licensors	also	must	not	object	to	
the	 further	 distribution	 of	 copies	 of	 the	 original	 program	 and	 the	 derivative	
works,	nor	require	any	royalties	to	be	paid.	a	particular	and	interesting	point	to	
note	is	that	open	and	free	software	licenses	may	give	rise	to	the	establishment	
of	a	network	of	 licenses,	where	people	can	be	at	 the	same	time	 licensors	and	
licensees;	 they	may	 create	 a	 network	 of	 availability	 for	 a	 computer	 program’s	
source	code,	where	everybody	is	free	to	ride	over	the	works	of	others	and	create	
new	works	which	can	immediately	turn	to	benefit	the	collective.
	 although	the	two	movements	share	those	general	characteristics,	there	
are	 important	distinctions. The	greatest	difference	between	 the	free	Software	
and	 Open	 Source	 [OS]	 movements	 is	 their	 approach	 toward	 the	 exercise	 of	
human	 agency	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 continuous	 chain	 of	 licenses	 in	 which	 any	
parasitic	 appropriation	 of	 code	 is	 forbidden.	 The	OS	movement	 believes	 it	 is	
merely	desirable	that	further	works	(derivative	works)	should	be	licensed	under	
the	same	regime	as	 the	original.	 instead,	users	must	be	given	 the	 freedom	to	
decide	whether	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 terms	of	 the	prior	 license.	hence,	 they	may	
be	entitled	to	create	new	works,	based	on	the	preceding	ones,	but	may	decide	
to	turn	those	works	into	proprietary	software	or	to	license	them	under	different	
open	source	or	even	free	software	 licenses.	Open	source	 licenses	thus	may	or	
11.	 Dahl,	Democracy and its Critics,	supra	note	7	at	p.	108.
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may	not	oblige	further	developers	to	adhere	to	the	terms	set	at	the	origin.	To	
meet	the	Open	Source	Definition,	they	are	simply	required	to	“allow	[the	works]	
to	be	distributed	under	the	same	terms	as	the	license	of	the	original	software.”12	
it	is	a	movement	with	libertarian	roots,	which	admits	the	least	possible	hindrance	
in	human	autonomy	and	believes	that	the	authors	of	derivative	works,	or	of	works	
that	are	just	based	on	the	prior	programs,	should	be	given	wider	discretion	with	
respect	to	which	model	to	follow.13	The	greatest	guru	of	this	movement	is	eric	
raymond,	author	of	The Cathedral and the Bazaar,14	the	most	emblematic	book	
about	the	model	of	production	that	yochai	Benkler	has	defined	as	a	“commons-
based	peer	production	model.”15	
	 The	 free	 Software	 movement,	 which	 was	 founded	 by	 former	 MiT	
engineer	richard	Matthew	Stallman	with	the	creation	of	the	gnU	Project	in	1985,	
is	based	on	the	idea	that	everybody	must	be	free	“to	run,	copy,	distribute,	study,	
change	 and	 improve”	 software.	 More	 analytically,	 its	 principles	 comprehend	
four	 different	 freedoms,	 namely:	 i)	 “the	 freedom	 to	 run	 the	 program,	 for	 any	
purpose”;	ii)	“the	freedom	to	study	how	the	program	works,	and	adapt	it	to	your	
needs”;	iii)	“the	freedom	to	redistribute	copies	so	you	can	help	your	neighbor”;	
and	iv)	“the	freedom	to	improve	the	program,	and	release	your	improvements	to	
the	public,	so	that	the	whole	community	benefits.”16	access	to	the	source	code	
is	a	precondition	for	the	exercise	of	the	second	and	fourth	of	these	freedoms.	in	
contrast	to	the	OS	movement,	the	free	Software	movement	relies	on	the	gnU	
general	Public	License17	to	create	an	infinite	circle	of	restriction	against	shifting	
any	piece	of	code	into	a	proprietary	regime.	The	gnU	gPL	uses	a	mechanism,	
called	 the	 “copyleft	 clause,”	which	yochai	Benkler	 and	 Jonathan	zittrain	 refer	
to	 as	 legal	 “jujitsu”18	 in	 the	 intellectual	property	 system.	The	ultimate	goal	of	
the	 copyleft	 clause	 is	 to	 avoid	 any	 subsequent	 appropriation	 of	 works	 which	
were	originally	licensed	in	a	regime	of	freedom.	every	work	that	is	derived	from	
or	 based	 on	 a	 free	 software	 program	must	 also	 remain	 free.	 Such	 a	 clause	 is	
thus	 antithetical	 to	 the	 intellectual	 property	 regime	 itself,	 a	 regime	which	 the	
12.	 Open	Source	Initiative,	“The	Open	Source	Definition,”	<http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd>, at	s.	3	
(emphasis	added).	
13.	 For	the	open	source	initiative,	there	are	no	given	features	in	the	system.	Freedom	is	a	possibility,	and	not	a	
perennial	constriction.	Open	source	adherents	believe	in	the	market,	which	must	not	be	obliged	to	share	
the	inner	values	of	the	free	software	movement.	As	Eric	Raymond	argues,	“[w]e	hackers	are	thinkers	and	
idealists	who	really	resonate	with	appeals	to	“principle”	and	“freedom”	and	“rights.”	Even	when	we	
disagree	with	bits	of	his	program,	we	want	[Richard	Stallman’s]	rhetorical	style	to	work;	we	think	it	ought	to	
work;	we	tend	to	be	puzzled	and	disbelieving	when	it	fails	on	the	95%	of	people	who	aren’t	wired	like	we	
are.”	See	Sam	Williams,	Free as in Freedom: Richard Stallman’s Crusade for Free Software	(O’Reilly,	2002),	
<http://www.oreilly.com/openbook/freedom/>	at	p.	115.
14.	 Eric	S.	Raymond,	The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental 
Revolutionary (O’Reilly,	2001),	<	http://safari.oreilly.com/0596001088>.
15.	 See	Yochai	Benkler,	“Coase’s	Penguins,	or	Linux	and	the	Nature	of	the	Firm,”	(2002)	112:3	Yale Law Journal	
369–446,	<http://yalelawjournal.org/112/3/369_yochai_benkler.html>	at	p.	375.
16.	 Free	Software	Foundation,	Inc.,	“The	Free	Software	Definition,”	GNU Project (April	2006),	<http://www.gnu.
org/philosophy/free-sw.html>.
17.	 See	Free	Software	Foundation,	Inc.,	“GNU	General	Public	License,”	(June	1991),	<http://www.gnu.org/
licenses/gpl.html>.
18.	 See	Benkler,	“Coase’s	Penguins,”	supra	note	15	at	p.	446;	and	Jonathan	Zittrain,	“Normative	Principles	for	
Evaluating	Free	and	Proprietary	Software,”	(2004)	71:1	University of Chicago Law Review	265–287,	<http://
ssrn.com/abstract=529862>	at	p.	269.
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free	Software	movement	opposes,19	 in	 line	with	 scholars	and	activists	 such	as	
Lawrence	 Lessig,20	 John	 Perry	 Barlow,21	 and	 many	 others	 who	 see	 in	 such	 a	
regime	an	inadequate	framework	for	dealing	with	goods	that	are	non-scarce	and	
non-rivalrous,	and	that	thus	must	be	spread	for	the	benefit	of	society.
	 The	 copyleft	 clause	 is	 criticized	 by	 some	 as	 possibly	 infringing	 or	
exceeding	 the	 principle	 of	 privity	 of	 contract22	 or	 the	 intellectual	 property	
doctrines	of	property	misuse	and	grantback.23	To	some	extent	the	critiques	may	
be	valid,	as	the	clause	seems	to	have	a	viral	effect	over	works	that	do	not	directly	
derive	 from	 free	 software	programs	but	 just	 use	 small	 parts	 of	 them,	 thereby	
implicating	 the	misappropriation	of	 those	works	by	 the	 collective	without	 any	
corresponding	quid pro quo.	it	appears	indeed	to	be	at	least	disproportionate	
that	a	whole	proprietary	program	can	be	legally	“contaminated”	by	little	pieces	
of	free	software	code	that	it	accidentally	reproduces.	To	the	extent	that	derivative	
programs	are	concerned,	however,	the	critiques	do	not	seem	be	valid,	as	copyright	
statutes	in	general	give	owners	the	exclusive	economic	right	to	allow	or	oppose	
the	development	of	derivative	works,	and,	of	course,	 to	set	 the	conditions	 for	
derivative	works.	 in	this	sense,	the	general	Public	License	only	embraces third	
parties	when	they	become	users	or	developers	of	derivative	works	based	on	the	
software	program—that	is	to	say,	when	they	are	not	third	parties	any	more	and	
can	be	lawfully	restrained	by	the	terms	of	the	license.
	 in	moral	 terms,	 one	may	 perhaps	 summarize	 the	 inherent	 differences	
between	the	free	Software	and	the	Open	Source	movements	by	saying,	together	
with	zittrain,	that	the	former	is	“deontological,”	and	the	latter	“consequentialist;”	
that	 the	 former	 “focuses	 on	 the	 innate	 responsibilities	 of	 software	 authors	 to	
share	 their	works	with	 others,”	 and	 the	 latter	 “on	 the	benefits	 that	 accrue	 to	
authors	and	users	if	they	avail	themselves	of	a	collaborative	development	model	
and	a	sharing	of	source	code.”24	
	 if	 there	 is	 a	 good	 example	 in	 jurisprudence	 to	 understand	 the	moral	
differences	between	free	Software	and	Open	Source	it	is	Lon	L.	fuller’s	notion	
of	 a	 dichotomy	 between	 a	 “morality	 of	 aspiration”	 and	 a	 “morality	 of	 duty.”	
The	morality of aspiration	 is	 “the	morality	of	 the	good	Life,	 of	 excellence,	of	
the	 fullest	 realization	of	human	powers.”25	 in	 this	concept,	as	fuller	describes,	
one	might	be	condemned	for	failure,	but	not	for	failure	to	perform	a	duty;	“for	
shortcoming,	but	not	for	wrongdoing.”	in	greek	society,	“instead	of	the	ideas	of	
19.	 See	Richard	M.	Stallman,	“Copyleft:	Pragmatic	Idealism,”	in	Joshua	Gay,	ed.,	Free Software, Free Society: 
Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman,	1st	ed. (GNU	Press,	2002)	93–95,	<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/
fsfs/rms-essays.pdf>	at	p.	93:		“My	work	on	free	software	is	motivated	by	an	idealistic	goal:	spreading	
freedom	and	cooperation.	I	want	to	encourage	free	software	to	spread	replacing	proprietary	software	that	
forbids	cooperation,	and	thus	make	our	society	better.	That’s	the	basic	reason	why	the	GNU	General	Public	
License	is	written	the	way	it	is—as	a	copyleft.”	
20.	 See	Lawrence	Lessig,	The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World	(Random	
House,	2001)	at	pp.	115–116:	“But	perfect	control	is	not	necessary	in	the	world	of	ideas.	Nor	it	is	wise.	[...]	
The	lack	of	rivalrousness	undercuts	the	justification	for	governmental	regulation.	The	extreme	protections	of	
property	are	neither	needed	for	ideas	nor	beneficial.”
21.	 See	John	Perry	Barlow,	“The	Economy	of	Ideas,”	(March	1994)	2.03	Wired Magazine,	<http://wired-vig.
wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html>.
22.	 See	Andres	Guadamuz	Gonzalez,	“Viral	Contracts	or	Unenforceable	Documents?	Contractual	Validity	of	
Copyleft	Licenses,”	(2004)	26:8	European Intellectual Property Review	331–339,	<http://ssrn.com/
abstract=569101>	at	p.	336.
23.	 See	Christian	H.	Nadan,	“Open	Source	Licensing:	Virus	or	Virtue,”	(2002)	10:3	Texas Intellectual Property 
Law Journal	349–378	at	pp.	367–371.
24.	 Zittrain,	“Normative	Principles,”	supra	note	18	at	p.	11.
25.	 Lon	L	Fuller,	The Morality of Law,	2d	ed.	(Yale	University	Press,	1969)	at	p.	5	(emphasis	added).
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right	and	wrong,	of	moral	claim	and	moral	duty,”	there	was	rather	“the	conception	
of	proper	and	fitting	conduct,”	which	represented	“a	human	being	functioning	
at	his	best.”26	according	to	fuller,	the	morality	of	aspiration	stands	 in	 intimate	
kinship	with	aesthetics	and	has	to	do	with	our	efforts	to	make	the	best	use	of	our	
short	lives.	On	the	other	hand:
where	 the	morality	of	aspiration	 starts	at	 the	 top	of	human	achievement,	 the	
morality of duty	starts	at	the	bottom.	it	lays	down	the	basic	rules	without	which	
an	ordered	society	is	impossible,	or	without	which	an	ordered	society	directed	
toward	certain	specific	goals	must	fail	of	its	mark.	[The	morality	of	duty	finds	its	
closest	 cousin	 in	 the	 law...]	 it	 does	 not	 condemn	men	 for	 failing	 to	 embrace	
opportunities	for	the	fullest	realization	of	their	powers.	instead,	it	condemns	them	
for	 failing	 to	 respect	 the	 basic	 requirements	 of	 social	 living.	 […]	 The	 moral	
injunction	“thou	shalt	not	kill”	implies	no	picture	of	the	perfect	life.	it	rests	on	the	
prosaic	truth	that	if	men	kill	one	another	off	no	conceivable	morality	of	aspiration	
can	be	realized.27
	 The	Open	Source	movement	thus,	has	freedom	as	an	ultimate	goal,	but	
one	which	must	be	achieved	by	free	will	and	conviction.	it	is	undoubtedly	more	
market	 friendly,	 for	 it	 is	 based	 simply	 upon	 aspirational principles	 and	 not	 on	
contractual	restrictions.	it	seems	to	understand	people	and	companies	as	well-
intentioned	entities	 that	will	 embrace	open	 source	 for	 its	 inherent	 values	 and	
utilities.	it	is	naturalist,	in	the	way	it	sees	technology	companies	almost	as	noble	
savages	that	will	pursue	the	good	if	let	alone.	it	is	rousseau,	before	life	in	society	
and	without	the	social	contract.	
	 The	 free	 Software	 movement,	 however,	 seems	 to	 acknowledge	 that	
it	 is	 impossible	 to	 correct	 a	market	 failure	 by	 simply	 giving	more	 freedom	 to	
the	 agents	 of	 the	market.	non-circulation	 of	 knowledge	 is	 an	 externality	 that	
harms	the	cognitive	ecology	and	is	not	likely	to	be	addressed	and	internalized	by	
those	who	want	to	benefit	from	the	disproportionate	informational	scarcity	that	
is	artificially	created	by	intellectual	property	laws.	The	logic,	hence,	is	that	society	
needs	a	proper	framework	to	address	this	externality	and	to	ensure	that	freedom	
is	 real	 freedom	 and	 not	 an	 aspirational	 ideal	 hindered	 by	 actual	 inequality.	
Because	it	focuses	on	its	principles	as	duties,	the	free	Software	movement	sets	
up	a	proper	framework	for	coping	with	their	probable	infringement.
	 Thus	 the	 copyleft	 clause	 is	 an	 active	 delimitation	 of	 freedom	 that	
must	be	 followed	by	all	 those	who	wish	 to	adhere	 to	 the	system	propounded	
by	 the	free	Software	movement.	 it	 raises	 the	question	whether	 the	principles	
embraced	by	the	free	Software	movement	are	a	floor	of	rights	to	be	followed	in	a	
democratic	society.	in	other	words,	it	makes	one	wonder	whether	for	all	of	us,	and	
especially	for	our	governments,	there	is	also	a	moral	duty	to	embrace	and	foster	
the	fulfillment	of	the	four	freedoms	of	the	free	Software	movement.	This	is	the	
question	the	parts	below	seek	to	address,	focusing	on	the	case	of	governments	
to	conclude	that	the	different	phenomena	reflected	by	the	free	and	Open	Source	
software	movement	fit	into	particular	dimensions	of	the	democratic	principle	in	
our	contemporary	society.
26.	 Fuller,	The Morality of Law,	supra	note	25	at	p.	5.
27.	 Fuller,	The Morality of Law,	supra	note	25	at	pp.	5–6,	11	(emphasis	added).
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	 from	now	on	i	will	refer	to	both	movements	in	general	as	the	free/Libre/
Open	Source	Software	movement	or,	simply,	fLOSS.	The	word	“libre,”	stemming	
from	french	and	Spanish,	has	been	 increasingly	used	 for	denoting	 that	“free”	
in	free	software	does	not	mean	“gratis,”	as	 in	“free	beer,”	but	free	as	 in	“free	
speech.”	it	shows	that	a	public	decision	with	respect	to	fLOSS	is	much	more	than	
an	economic	issue.
*
3. FLOSS In DeMOCrATIC STATeS: A COMPArATIve ASSeSSMenT OF 
InTernATIOnAL POLICIeS
does the fact that democratIc governments	 around	 the	world	have	been	
increasingly	adopting	fLOSS	add	any	particular	flavour	to	this	discussion?	Does	
it	bring	any	strength	to	my	claims	that	there	is	a	connection	between	software	
and	 democracy?	 That	 inference	 would	 perhaps	 be	 harder	 to	 sustain	 if	 the	
decisions	 have	 been	 taken	 based	 on	 purely	 econometric	 grounds.	 what	 is	
interesting,	however,	is	that	even	countries	that	decided	to	adopt	a	balanced	or	
neutral	approach,	that	is	to	say,	even	those	countries	that	do	not	want	to	appear	
to	be	making	 their	decisions	based	on	 ideological	arguments	cannot	help	but	
insert	in	their	public	policies	the	recognition	of	values	and	principles	analogous	
to	those	inherent	in	the	fLOSS	movement.
	 canada,	 for	 instance,	 which	 apparently	 has	 adopted	 a	 conciliatory	
approach,28	in	reality	reflects	in	its	architecture’s	principles29	some	rules	that	seem	
to	be	only	met	or	better	met	by	fLOSS	programs,	with	available	source	code	and	
the	possibility	of	unrestricted	use,	reuse,	and	modification.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
canadian	position	on	fLOSS	acknowledges	that	the	government	policies	are	not	
oriented	towards	mandatory	adoption.	The	relevant	faQ	section	of	the	Treasury	
Board	 of	 canada	 Secretariat30	 website	 clearly	 states	 that	 the	 government	 of	
canada’s	approach	is	to	have	“departments	and	agencies	base	their	decisions	to	
acquire,	develop	and	use	software,	including	open	source,	on their business needs	
and	the	principles	set	out	in	the	government’s	federated	architecture	Program.”31
	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 among	 the	 mentioned	 principles	 there	 are	 rules	
that	are	clearly	oriented	towards	values	that	are	only	or	mostly	shared	by	fLOSS	
programs,	such	as	the	following	statements:	
28.	 Treasury	Board	of	Canada,	Chief	Information	Officer	Branch,	“GOC	Proposed	Position	on	Open	Source	
Software	and	Next	Steps,” (7	April	2004),	<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fap-paf/oss-ll/oss-ll/oss-ll_e.pdf>	at	p.	7.	
The	Treasury	Board	Secretariat	stated	that	between	“[taking]	no	official	position	regarding	the	evolution	of	
OSS	within	the	federal	administration,”	or	“[mandating]	preferences	for	the	use	of	OSS	across	the	federal	
administration,”	it	is	preferable	to	“[a]dopt	a	balanced	approach	to	OSS.”	
29.	 Treasury	Board	of	Canada	Secretariat,	Chief	Information	Officer	Branch,	“Government	of	Canada,	
Federated	Architecture,	Iteration	One,”	(10	August	2001),	<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fap-paf/documents/
iteration/iteration05_e.asp>.
30.	 “The	Treasury	Board	Secretariat	is	responsible	for	the	[Government	of	Canada	(GoC)]	policy	on	open	source	
software	and	for	managing	governance	and	oversight	of	the	Government	of	Canada	Federated	Architecture	
Program.	Comptrollership	processes	ensure	that	GoC	projects	conform	to	the	FAP.”	Treasury	Board	of	
Canada	Secretariat,	Chief	Information	Officer	Branch,	“Open	Source	Software	Position,” (29	June	2004),	
<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fap-paf/oss-ll/position_e.asp>.	
31.	 Treasury	Board	of	Canada	Secretariat,	Chief	Information	Officer	Branch,	“Open	Source	Software	Frequently	
Asked	Questions,” (23	August	2004),	<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fap-paf/oss-ll/faq_e.asp>	(emphasis	added).
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•	 Principle	 6,	 “priority	will	 be	given	 to	products	 adhering	 to	 industry	
standards	and	open architecture”;32	
•	 Principle	1,	“[w]e	must	re-engineer application systems	to	be	‘highly	
modular’	and	‘loosely	coupled’	to	be	able to reuse components”;33	
•	 “[r]educing	 integration	 complexity”	 by	 “establishing a ‘culture of 
reuse’	through	the	use	of	incentives”;	and	
•	 “building	 and	 integrating reusable components	 must	 become	 a	
common	development	method.”34	
in	 a	 cost	 comparison	 model	 between	 proprietary	 software	 and	 fLOSS	
programs,	the	Secretariat	shows	that	the	payback	period	for	the	migration	from	
the	former	group	to	the	latter	is	estimated	to	be	only	one	year	and	six	months,	
and	the	economy	from	then	on	is	approximately	half	the	amount	of	the	regular	
expenses	with	hardware,	people,	and	 licenses	 involving	proprietary	software.35	
This	alone	raises	the	question	why	proprietary	systems	are	maintained.	But	the	
reasons	are	much	deeper	than	economics.
	 Showing	 how	 factors	 surrounding	 the	 implementation	 of	 fLOSS	 go	
much	beyond	 the	 technical	 argument,	 a	 very	 comprehensive	 study	conducted	
by	e-cology	corporation	under	a	contract	with	the	government	of	canada	has	
pointed	out	that	“[t]here	are	numerous	examples	of	effective	use	of	OSS	within	
the	public	sector	today	but	lack	of	clear	OSS	policy	is	creating	fear, uncertainty 
and doubt	 about	 its	 legitimacy	 preventing	 optimal	 exploitation”36	 it	 also	
acknowledged	that	fLOSS	is	“a	form	of	“market	correction,”	“a	transformative	
process	 that	when	done	successfully,	opens	a	new	world	of	possibilities,”	and	
“a	strategic	element	of	icT	and beyond.”37	Thus,	the	study	recommended	that	
the	government	 of	canada	 “seize	OSS	 opportunities	 through	 clear	 and	well-
communicated	policies	and	by	being proactive without being provocative.”38	
	 it	 is	 very	 clear,	 therefore,	 when	 speaking	 about	 provocative policies,	
about	an	element	that	is	beyond	information	and	communication	technologies,	
and	about	fear, uncertainty, and doubt,	that	the	debates	are	not	circulating	on	
purely	technological	grounds—and	likewise	when	“an	 ‘electronic’ commons	by	
the	private	and	public	sector”	is	proposed	as	something	of	strategic	importance	
to	canada’s	future,”39	when	one	of	the	arguments	proffered	on	behalf	of	fLOSS	
policies	 are	 “political considerations	 such	 as	 national autonomy,”40	 and	when	
developers	feel	that	the	“key	benefit	[of	fLOSS]	is	cultural,	not	[...]	code.”41	
	 in	 short,	 something	 more	 is	 going	 on,	 and	 it	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	
socioeconomic,	political,	 and	cultural	environment	 in	which	fLOSS	 is	 inserted.	
32.	 Treasury	Board,	“GOC	Proposed	Position,”	supra	note	28	at	p.	12	(emphasis	added).
33.	 Treasury	Board,	“GOC	Proposed	Position,”	supra	note	28	at	p.	10	(emphasis	added).
34.	 Treasury	Board,	“Federated	Architecture,	Iteration	One,”	(18	October	2001),	<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fap-
paf/documents/iteration/iteration05_e.asp>	at	“Architecture	Principle	1” (emphasis	added).
35.	 Treasury	Board,	““Free	and	Open	Source	Software:	Overview	and	Preliminary	Guidelines	for	the	
Government	of	Canada,”	supra	note	2.
36.	 e-Cology	Corporation,	Open Source Business Opportunities for Canada’s Information and Communications 
Technology Sector: A Collaborative Fact Finding Study (September	2003),	<http://www.e-cology.ca/canfloss/
report/CANfloss_Report.pdf>	at	p.	5	(emphasis	added).
37.	 e-Cology	Corporation,	Open Source Business Opportunities,	supra	note	36	at	p.	65	(emphasis	added).
38.	 e-Cology	Corporation,	Open Source Business Opportunities,	supra	note	36	at	p.	5	(emphasis	added).
39.	 e-Cology	Corporation,	Open Source Business Opportunities,	supra	note	36	at	p.	7	(emphasis	added).
40.	 e-Cology	Corporation,	Open Source Business Opportunities,	supra	note	36	at	p.	9	(emphasis	added).
41.	 e-Cology	Corporation,	Open Source Business Opportunities,	supra	note	36	at	p.	28	(emphasis	added).
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with	 its	 power	 to	 affect	 social	 relations	 in	 all	 their	 dimensions,	what	 leads	 to	
the	certainty	that	“OSS	policy	in	any	government	would	need	to	be	congruent	
and	 integrated	with	 its	broader policies and objectives”?42	 The	 question	 that	
follows	is,	if	all	those	beneficial	elements	are	present	in	fLOSS,	why	the	concern	
about	being	provocative?	is	it	such	a	relevant	and	cogent	policy	not	to	upset	a	
corporation,	or	does	the	duty	of	a	government	lie	precisely	in	satisfying	the	public	
interest	in	the	fulfilment	of	the	broader	societal	promises	of	a	real	democracy?
	 canada	 is	not	alone	 in	 the	ambiguity	of	 its	discourse.	The	cacophony	
of	public	policies	with	respect	to	fLOSS	reflects	the	same	dichotomy	as	in	the	
relations	between	 the	 free	 software	 and	 the	open	 source	movements.	 That	 is	
to	say,	for	some,	the	principles	of	the	fLOSS	movement	are	not	more	than	an	
aspiration	to	be	fulfilled	by	indirect	and	non-mandatory	policies.	for	others,	there	
is	actually	a	governmental	duty	to	take	more	proactive	steps	to	embrace	those	
principles.	The	United	States,	for	instance,	reflects	such	a	dichotomy	within	the	
federation	itself.	On	one	hand,	the	federal	government	refrains	from	taking	clear	
steps	towards	the	promotion	of	fLOSS	by	instructing	that	its	adoption	by	federal	
agencies	and	public	bodies	be	based	on	objective	factors.	On	the	other	hand,	
some	US	states	are	concretely	pursuing	proper	avenues	for	promoting	fLOSS	as	
a	duty.
	 The	 US	 federal	 government’s	 approach,	 however,	 is	 not	 so	 different	
from	 canada’s	 approach.	 By	 invoking	 the	 liberal	 principle	 of	 technological	
neutrality,which	is	sometimes	erroneously	cited	as	an	obstacle	to	governmental	
preferences	towards	fLOSS,	the	US	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	 issued	
the	Memorandum	M-04-16	 for	 the	 Senior	 Procurement	 executives	 and	 chief	
information	Officers	of	the	federal	government,	requiring	information	technology	
investment	decisions	to	be	“technology	and	vendor	neutral,”	as	well	as	stating	that	
“to	the	maximum	extent	practicable,	agency	implementation	should	be	similarly	
neutral.”43	 The	 path	 to	 neutrality	 would	 supposedly	 rely	 on	 objective	 factors.	
in	this	sense,	the	Memorandum	lays	out	that	“agency	 iT	 investment	decisions,	
including	 software,	 must	 be	 made	 consistent	 with	 the	 agency’s	 enterprise	
architecture	and	the	federal	enterprise	architecture”	and	that	“agencies	must	
consider	the	total	cost	of	ownership	 including	 lifecycle	maintenance	costs,	 the	
costs	associated	with	risk	issues,	including	security	and	privacy	of	data,	and	the	
costs	of	ensuring	security	of	the	iT	system	itself.”44	with	respect	to	fLOSS,	the	
Memorandum	does	not	establish	any	 visible	preferential	 criteria,	 limiting	 itself	
to	 register	 that	 the	 “reminder	 applies	 to	 acquisitions	 of	 all	 software,	whether	
it	 is	proprietary	or	Open	Source	Software,”	and	“must	be	considered	when	an	
agency	 is	planning	a	 software	acquisition,”	 since	“differences	 in	 licensing	may	
affect	the	use,	the	security,	and	the	total	cost	of	ownership	of	the	software.”45
	 however,	when	one	 looks	 into	 the	 framework	defined	 for	 the	federal	
enterprise	 architecture,	 as	 in	 canada,	 it	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 find	 some	 criteria	
which	are	better	or	only	met	by	fLOSS.	The	circular	setting	out	the	rules	for	the	
42.	 e-Cology	Corporation,	Open Source Business Opportunities,	supra	note	36	at	p.	37	(emphasis	added).
43.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	Office	of	Management	and	Budget,	“Software	Acquisition,” Memorandum	
M-014-16,	(USA,	1	July	2004),	<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy04/m04-16.html>.
44.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Software	Acquisition,”	supra	note	43.
45.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Software	Acquisition,”	supra	note	43.
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Management	of	federal	information	resources,46	for	instance,	which	is	mentioned	
in	the	Memorandum	above,	expressly	defines	as	one	of	its	basic	considerations	
and	 assumptions	 that	 “[t]he	 open	 and	 efficient	 exchange	 of	 scientific	 and	
technical	government	information,	subject	to	applicable	national	security	controls	
and	the	proprietary	rights	of	others,	fosters	excellence	in	scientific	research	and	
effective	use	of	federal	 research	and	development	 funds.”47	The	 fact	 that	 the	
circular	acknowledges	the	existence	of	proprietary	rights	should,	of	course,	not	
obstruct	the	understanding	that	that	basic	assumption	would	be	even	better	met	
whenever	proprietary	rights	have	been	generally	assigned	or	waived	by	the	will	
of	the	rightsholders	themselves.	furthermore,	the	existence	of	proprietary	rights	
is	clearly	set	out	to	be	read	as	an	exception,	and	not	as	the	rule.
	 The	 circular	 also	 defines	 enterprise	 architecture	 (ea)	 principles	 and	
goals,48	 and	 provides	 that	 an	 ea	 must	 “set	 direction	 on	 such	 issues	 as	 the	
promotion of interoperability,	open systems,[49]	public access,	 compliance	with	
gPea,	end	user	satisfaction,	and	iT	security.”50	agencies	must	implement	the	ea	
so	as	to	be	consistent	with	principles	such	as	“[facilitating]	interoperability,”51	and	
“[meeting]	information	technology	needs	through	cost	effective	intra-agency and 
interagency sharing,	before	acquiring	new	information	technology	resources.”52	
it	also	requires	that	the	 level	of	security	of	 information	technology	systems	be	
“commensurate	to	the	risk	and	magnitude	of	the	harm	resulting	from	the	loss,	
misuse,	 unauthorized	 access	 to,	 or	 modification	 of	 the	 information	 stored	 or	
flowing	 through	 these	 systems.”53	 very	 pertinently,	 those	principles	 show	 that	
access	to	governmental	information,	including	data	and	electronic	records,	must	
be	set	as	the	rule,	and	not	the	exception	in	a	democratic	country,	as	was	observed	
above	and	will	be	developed	further	below.
	 But	 the	 federal	US	 framework	 does	 not	 help	 to	 define	 any	 duty	with	
respect	to	the	adoption	of	fLOSS,	and,	in	contrast	to	the	canadian	framework,	it	
does	not	give	any	more	express	clues	about	the	ideological	values	that	underlie	
its	 principles.	 however,	 some	 american	 states	 have	 propositions	 that	 clearly	
align	with	the	claims	being	advanced	in	this	paper.	The	recent	movement	in	the	
commonwealth	 of	Massachusetts,	 received	 with	 great	 interest	 by	 the	media,	
provoked	an	intense	turmoil	that	caused	the	Senate	to	request	the	testimony	of	
Peter	Quinn,	the	State’s	chief	information	Officer	of	the	information	Technology	
46.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	Office	of	Management	and	Budget,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	
Resources,”	Circular	No.	A-130	Revised,	Transmittal	Memorandum	No.	4,	(USA,	28	November	2000),	
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a130/a130trans4.html>.
47.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	Resources,”	supra	note	46	at	s.	7(k).
48.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	Resources,”	supra	note	46	at	
s.	8(b)(2)(a).	According	to	this	section,	“[a]n	EA	is	the	explicit	description	and	documentation	of	the	current	
and	desired	relationships	among	business	and	management	processes	and	information	technology.	It	
describes	the	‘current	architecture’	and	‘target	architecture’	to	include	the	rules	and	standards	and	systems	
life	cycle	information	to	optimize	and	maintain	the	environment	which	the	agency	wishes	to	create	and	
maintain	by	managing	its	IT	portfolio.”
49.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	Resources,”	supra	note	46	at	
Appendix	IV.	An	open	system	is	defined	as	a	system	“based	on	an	architecture	with	published	or	
documented	interface	specifications	that	have	been	adopted	by	a	standards	settings	body.”	
50.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	Resources,”	supra	note	46	at	s.	8(b)
(2)(a)	(emphasis	added).
51.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	Resources,”	supra	note	46	at	s.	8(b)
(2)(a)(i).
52.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	Resources,”	supra	note	46	at	s.	8(b)
(2)(a)(ii)	(emphasis	added).
53.	 Executive	Office	of	the	President,	“Management	of	Federal	Information	Resources,”	supra	note	46	at	s.	8(b)
(2)(a)(iii).
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Division,	and	culminated	in	his	resignation.54
	 in	 short,	 what	 happened	 in	 Massachusetts	 was	 a	 political battle	
surrounding	the	adoption	of	an	open	format	for	the	commonwealth’s	government	
documents—a	political	battle	on	a	democratic	issue.	as	very	well	expressed	by	
Quinn,	“the	commonwealth’s	documents	belong	to	 its	people	and	should	not	
be	locked	up	in	proprietary	formats	that	either	restrict	access	to	those	who	are	
willing	and	able	to	buy	particular	software	tools	to	open	them,	or	prevent	access	
to	 those	 records	 in	 the	 far	 future	because	 their	 readability	 is	dependent	upon	
software	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 available.”55	 Under	 his	 leadership,	 Massachusetts’	
information	 Technology	 Division	 decided	 to	 include	 the	 obligatory	 adoption	
of	the	Open	Document	format	(ODf)	 in	version	3.5	of	 its	enterprise	Technical	
reference	Model	(eTrM),	based	on	the	finding	that	ODf	is	“developed	through	
an	 open	 peer	 review	 process,	 is	 maintained	 by	 an	 open	 community,	 and	 is	
available	under	patent	and	copyright	licenses	that	impose	minimal	restrictions	on	
software	developers	who	wish	to	write	applications	to	support	it,	now	and	in	the	
distant	future.”56
	 The	 Open	 Document	 format	 is	 not	 fLOSS.	 it	 can	 also	 be	 used	 by	
proprietary	 vendors	 in	 the	development	 of	 their	 programs.	 To	date,	 however,	
Microsoft,	the	biggest	provider	of	office	software	suites still	does	not	use	open	
standards	in	its	programs,	and	this	was	precisely	the	root	of	the	controversy	in	
Massachusetts.	even	though	ODf	is	not	fLOSS,	the	arguments	put	forward	to	
advocate	 its	mandatory	use	 in	Massachusetts	are	not	any	different	 from	those	
traditionally	used	with	respect	to	fLOSS.	They	also	clearly	show	that	the	adoption	
of	open	criteria,	be	it	with	respect	to	standards	or	code,	does	not	mean	giving	
preference	to	one	provider	over	another,	but	it	opens	the	path	for	competition	in	
the	provision	of	iT	services.	as	accurately	asserted	in	the	eTrM	version	3.5	faQ,	
the	“adoption	of	 the	Open	Document	format	creates	no	preference	tied	to	a	
particular	product	or	vendor.	Because	the	Open	Document	format	 is	an	open	
format,	available	 to	all,	 it	can	be	adopted	by	any	vendor	who	seeks	 to	create	
desktop	software.”57	and	so	can	fLOSS....
	 Massachusetts	is	the	only	american	state	to	adopt	an	explicit	orientation	
towards	 openness	 in	 the	 computerisation	 of	 its	 government.	 Other	 states,	
however,	have	recently	studied	the	adoption	of	acts	that	would	either	invert	the	
pattern	for	contracting	software,	turning	the	use	of	proprietary	programs	into	an	
exception,	or	mandate	the	adoption	of	fLOSS.		in	an	example	of	the	former,	house	
54.	 For	a	lively	discussion	on	this	issue,	see	Pamela	Jones,	“Peter	Quinn	Exonerated,”	(12	December	2005)	
Groklaw,	<http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20051210103842722>.	
55.	 Peter	Quinn,	Chief	Information	Officer,	testimony	in	“Open	Document	Format,”	hearing	(USA	MA,	21	
October	2005),	Senate	Post	Audit	and	Oversight	Committee,	184th	General	Court	of	the	Commonwealth	of	
Massachusetts,	<http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=itdterminal&&L=3&L0=Home&L1=Open+Initiatives&L2=O
penDocument&sid=Aitd&b=terminalcontent&f=open_odf_cio_hpao_testimony&csid=Aitd>.
56.	 Quinn,	testimony	in	“Open	Document	Format,”	supra	note	55.
57.	 Information	Technology	Division,	“Final	ETRM	Version	3.5	Open	Document	Format	Standard:	Frequently	
Asked	Questions,”	(USA	MA,	21	September	2005),	<http://www.mass.gov/Aitd/docs/policies_standards/
etrm3dot5/opendocformfaqs.pdf	>.	It	was	not	very	surprising	that	all	providers	but	Microsoft	Corporation	
applauded	the	adoption	of	the	format.	See	Alan	Yates,	General	Manager,	Microsoft	Corporation,	“Re:	
Proposed	Revisions	to	Information	Domain-Enterprise	Technical	Reference	Model,”	submission	regarding	
“Open	Document	Format,”	to	Executive	Office	for	Administration	&	Finance	and	Information	Technology	
Division,	(USA	MA,	8	September	2005),	<http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=itdterminal&L=3&L0=Home&L1=O
pen+Initiatives&L2=OpenDocument&sid=Aitd&b=terminalcontent&f=policies_standards_etrm_35_
responses_microsoft&csid=Aitd>.	
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Bill	2892	in	Oregon,58	although	it	established	a	value-for-money	criterion,	would	
have	 required	 the	 government	 to	 “[c]onsider	 acquiring	 open	 source	 software	
products	in	addition	to	proprietary	software	products,”59	and	to	justify	any	option	
for	proprietary	software.60	among	several	motives	for	the	bill,	one	in	particular	
was	very	interesting	as	it	indicated	the	political	dimension	of	the	debate.	The	bill	
acknowledged	that	“[i]t	is	also	in	the	public	interest	that	the	state	be	free,	to	the	
greatest	extent	possible,	of	 restrictions	 imposed	by	parties	outside	 the	state’s	
control.”61	an	example	of	 the	 latter	  was	Texas,	where	Senate	Bill	1579	would	
have	required	the	government	to	comply	with	the	definition	of	open source	and	
open standards	 in	 the	procurement	of	 software.	Texas’s	bill,	which	 is	 stronger	
than	 Oregon’s,	 included	 detailed	 provisions	 to	 show	 that	 choosing	 between	
fLOSS	 or	 proprietary	 software	 is	 not	 a	matter	 of	 choosing	 between	 different	
products	(and	thus	discriminating	vendors),	but	simply	a	matter	of	defining	the	
correct	model	of	contracting.	Thus	 it	states,	 inter alia,	 that	a	“contract	 for	 the	
procurement	of	software	under	this	section	shall	comply	with	Section	2054.114”62	
(the	section	 that	defines	open	source	and	open	standards).	This	 is	also	clearly	
asserted	with	respect	to	the	definition	of	open	standards,	where	the	bill	states	
that	“‘[o]pen	 standards’	means	 specifications	 for	 the	encoding	and	 transfer	of	
computer	data	that:	 […among	other	things]	 (D)	do	not	favor	one	implementer	
over	another	for	any	reason	other	than	the	technical	standards	compliance	of	an	
implementation.”63	in	2004,	the	State	of	california	enacted	a	statute	concerning	
the	adoption	of	open	source	software	in	all	of	its	ballot	tally	voting	machines.64	
	 in	contrast	to	the	american	model,	the	european	Union	and	its	Member	
countries	 have	 embraced	 a	 more	 prospective	 and	 principles-oriented	 policy,	
explicitly	 recognizing	 the	 underlying	 values supporting	 fLOSS	 adoption	 by	
governments.	as	Mr.	 Jean-Marie	Lapeyre,	 chief	 technical	officer	of	 the	french	
tax	agency,	one	of	the	largest	entities	to	migrate	to	fLOSS	in	europe,	has	very	
sensibly	observed,	there	is	a	cultural	difference	between	the	anglo-american	and	
the	french	way	of	approaching	things.	in	his	words,	“[i]t’s	not	anti-american;	it’s	a	
cultural	difference—we	think	differently.	[...]	The	english	focus	is	on	action,	while	
we	 [the	french]	are	more	reflective.”65	 it	would	be	preferable	to	say,	however,	
58.	 See	Lisa	M	Bowman,	“Open	source	battle	heats	up	over	Oregon	bill,”	(10	April	2003)	ZDNet UK,	<http://
news.zdnet.co.uk/software/0,39020381,2133230,00.htm>.	Records	from	that	time	show	how	eloquent	the	
debate	was,	with	agents	of	the	proprietary	model	afraid	that	the	enactment	of	Oregon’s	bill	could	create	a	
strong	precedent	to	be	followed	by	other	states	and	by	the	European	Union.	The	debate	was	marked	by	an	
anti-Microsoft	sentiment,	while	the	company	threatened	to	sue	Oregon	schools	for	piracy	if	they	did	not	
acquire	new	licenses	of	Microsoft	products.	
59.	 Bill for an Act Relating to software acquisition by state government,	Bill	HB 2892	(USA	OR,	2003),	72nd	
Oregon	Legislative	Assembly,	<http://www.leg.state.or.us/03reg/measures/hb2800.dir/hb2892.intro.html>	at	
s.	1(2)(a)	[HB	2892],	reintroduced	as	Bill for an Act Relating to software acquisition by state government,	Bill	
HB	2642	(USA	OR,	2005)	73rd	Oregon	Legislative	Assembly,	<http://landru.leg.state.or.us/05reg/measures/
hb2600.dir/hb2642.intro.html>.
60.	 HB	2892,	supra	note	59	at	s.	1(2)(c).
61.	 HB	2892,	supra	note	59	at	Preamble,	1(f).
62.	 A Bill to be Entitled an Act relating to software acquisition by state agencies,	Bill	SB 1579	(USA	TX,	13	
March				2003),	78th	Texas	Legislative	Session,	<http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/78R/billtext/pdf/
SB01579I.pdf>	at	s.	8(i)	[SB	1579].	
63.	 SB	1579,	supra	note	62,	s.	1(2)(D).
64.	 Relative to ballot tally software,	Bill	ACR 242	(USA	CA,	3	June	2004),	2003–2004	Assembly	<http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0201-0250/acr_242_bill_20040603_introduced.html>,	enacted	on	3	
June	2004	as	2004 Statutes of California	ch.	242,	<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0201-
0250/acr_242_bill_20040831_chaptered.html>.
65.	 Ingrid	Marson,	“Europe	and	the	US	Philosophically	Divided	on	Open	Source?”	(8	November	2005)	ZDNet 
UK,	<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/software/0,1000000121,39235707,00.htm>.
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that	such	a	reflective	way	of	doing	public	policy	is	not	exclusive	to	france,	but	it	
is	rather	a	characteristic	of	continental	europe	in	general.
	 The	 european	 commission’s	 Open	 Source	 Observatory66	 summarizes 
in	 a	 very	 fortunate	 fashion,	 and	 in	 harmony	with	 the	 argument	 of	 this	 article,	
that	 if	 “[d]ifferent	organisations	have	different	 reasons	 for	 choosing	OSS”	 this	
happens	“especially	in	the	public	sector	where politics and other non-technical 
issues play a role.”67	These	 issues	are	widely	 reflected	 in	 the	many	aspects	of	
fLOSS	considered	by	the	commission.	indeed,	in	the	document	on	“The	Many	
aspects	of	Open	Source	Software,”	 the	Open	Source	Observatory	 recognizes	
the	existence	of	political,	economical,	technical,	social	and	legal	aspects	for	the	
adoption	of	fLOSS	by	the	governments	of	the	Member	states.68	
	 for	those	who	tremble	before	any	ideological	line	of	argumentation,	it	
will	be	particularly	challenging	to	see	the	european	commission	speaking	about	
fLOSS	as	a	means	of	promoting	freedom	and	equality,	of	stimulating	a	digital	
heritage,	 of	 making	 education	 available	 and	 providing	 fun	 to	 students,	 and	
even	of	gathering	social	groups	of	developers	who	before	would	work	as	“lone	
rangers.”	in	effect,	the	principles	advocated	by	the	commission	extend	through	
a	vast	territory	of	justifications	that	are	not	only	drenched	in	ideological	concepts	
but	also	extremely	interconnected	with	a	wide	understanding	of	the	democratic	
principle,	as	i	will	examine.	The	encouragement	of	the	use	of	fLOSS	is	also	set	
out	in	the	eEurope 2005 Action Plan,	which	was	launched	in	the	Seville	european	
council	 in	 2002,	 and	 aims	 to	 develop	modern	 public	 services	 and	 a	 dynamic	
environment	 for	 e-business	 in	 europe.69	 in	 action	 3.1.1,	 the	 Plan	 established	
that	 the	 interoperability	 framework	of	pan-european	e-government	services	to	
citizens	and	enterprises	would	“be	based	on	open	standards	and	encourage	the	
use	of	open	source	software.”70	The	Plan	also	prescribed	a	wider	use	of	open	
standards	and	open	source	software	as	a	means	to	achieve	network	security71	and	
mandated	that	some	cases	of	good	practices	for	e-services	should	be	selected	
and	documented,	 resulting	 in	 templates	or	guidelines	which	will	 “consist	 of	 a	
methodology,	an	associated	set	of	tools	and	software	in	open-source	form.”72	it	
is	also	remarkable	that	the	commission	approved	a	model	license	for	software	
developed	 by	 the	 eU	 (the	 eUPL—european	 Union	 Public	 License),	 which	
66.	 IDABC	European	eGovernment	Services,	“The	Programme,”	<http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/chapter/3>.	
The	Open	Source	Observatory	is	run	by	the	European	Commission’s	IDABC	(Interoperable	Delivery	of	
European	eGovernment	Services	to	public	Administrations,	Businesses	and	Citizens),	which	is	an	EU	
program	that	has	as	its	goals	to	encourage	and	support	the	delivery	of	cross-border	public	sector	services	
to	citizens	and	enterprises	in	Europe,	to	improve	efficiency	and	collaboration	between	European	public	
administrations,	and	to	contribute	to	making	Europe	an	attractive	place	to	live,	work	and	invest.
67.	 IDABC	European	eGovernment	Services,	Open	Source	Observatory,	“The	Many	Aspects	of	Open	Source	
Software,”	<http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/1744/468>	(emphasis	added).
68.	 IDABC	European	eGovernment	Services,	Open	Source	Observatory,	“The	Many	Aspects	of	Open	Source	
Software,”	supra	note	67.
69.	 See	Commission	of	the	European	Communities,	eEurope 2005: An Information Society for All: An Action 
Plan to be presented in view of the Sevilla European Council, 21/22 June 2002,	COM(2002)	263 (EU,	28	May	
2002)	<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2002/news_library/documents/eeurope2005/
eeurope2005_en.pd>.
70.	 Commission	of	the	European	Communities,	eEurope 2005,	supra	note	69	at	p.	11.
71.	 Commission	of	the	European	Communities,	eEurope 2005,	supra	note	69	at	p.	16.
72.	 Commission	of	the	European	Communities,	eEurope 2005,	supra	note	69	at	p.	18.
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expressly	adopts	 the	copyleft	clause.73	The	 justifications	 for	 this,	 reflected	 in	a	
study	developed	at	the	commission’s	request,	were	based	on	the	view	that	“a	
copyleft	license	is	necessary”	if	“the	commission	intends	to	be	protected	against	
the	appropriation	of	the	application	by	third	parties	and	to	benefit	from	further	
developments	made	by	its	licensees.”74
	 following	 the	 broader	 umbrella	 of	 the	 european	commission,	 and	 in	
some	cases	preceding	 it,	a	generous	number	of	Member	states	have	adopted	
fLOSS	policies	to	a	smaller	or	larger	extent.	comprehensive	studies	conducted	
by	 UnU-MeriT75	 under	 the	 fLOSSPols	 Project	 have	 found	 that	 up	 to	 around	
79%	of	european	local	authorities	use	fLOSS.76	among	the	leading	countries	are	
Spain,	italy,	austria,	germany,	Belgium,	Sweden	and	france,	and	among	those	
who	use	less	fLOSS	are	greece	and	the	Uk.77	The	study	shows	that	“[r]eluctance	
to	an	increase	of	the	share	of	fLOSS	is	especially	expressed	by	respondents	from	
the	Uk,	which	appears	to	have	a	relatively	low	share	of	fLOSS	users.”78	far	from	
being	 insignificant,	 this	data	 intertwines	with	 the	observations	 raised	by	Jean-
Marie	Lapeyre	to	show	how	the	cultural	differences	between	the	english	speaking	
world	and	the	rest	of	europe	contribute	to	how	public	policies	concerning	fLOSS	
are	carried	out.	They	are	not	just	cultural	differences	but	also	political,	and	reflect,	
for	instance,	different	understandings	with	respect	to	human	rights79	and	different	
conceptions	of	the	democratic	principle.
	 Many	 european	 countries,	 such	 as	 Sweden,	 Uk,	 Belgium,	 germany,	
france,	 Spain,	 italy,	 estonia,	 finland,	 Lithuania,	 and	 netherlands,	 adopted	
policies	encouraging	(not	mandating)	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	to	some	extent	–	
which	has	been	happening	extensively,	while	Denmark	and	the	netherlands	have	
mandated	 the	 adoption	 of	Open	 Standards.80	 italy,	 by	means	 of	 a	Ministerial	
Decree,	 instituted	 a	 commission	 for	 fLOSS	 in	 public	 administration	 charged	
with	examining	the	technical,	economic,	and	organizational	aspects	of	 the	use	
of	 fLOSS.81	 The	 government	 was	 of	 the	 view	 that	 “the	 distribution	 and	 the	
evolution	of	OS	software	can	in	fact	determine	a	series	of	advantages	in	terms	
of:	 containment	 of	 price,	 security	 and	 transparency,	 non-dependence	 upon	 a	
73.	 European	Union,	“European	Union	Public	Licence	v1.0,”EUPL	v1.1-EN	(EU,	9	January	2007),	<http://
ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=27470>.	The	“Copyleft	Clause”	is	in	s.	5:	“If	the	Licensee	distributes	
and/or	communicates	copies	of	the	Original	Works	or	Derivative	Works	based	upon	the	Original	Work,	this	
Distribution	and/or	Communication	will	be	done	under	the	terms	of	this	EUPL	Licence.	The	Licensee	
(becoming	Licensor)	cannot	offer	or	impose	any	additional	terms	or	conditions	on	the	Work	or	Derivative	
Work	that	alter	or	restrict	the	terms	of	the	Licence.”	
74.	 European	Commission,	Enterprise	Directorate	General,	IDA/GPOSS,	“Encouraging	Good	Practice	in	the	
Use	of	Open	Source	Software	in	Public	Administrations:	Report	on	Open	Source	Licensing	of	Software	
Developed	by	The	European	Commission	(applied	to	the	CIRCA	solution),” (EU,	16	December	2004),	
<http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=24394>,	p.	19.
75.	 MERIT,	“Results	and	Policy	Paper	from	Survey	of	Government	Authorities	FLOSSPols,” (Maastricht,	25	
August	2005),	<http://flosspols.org/deliverables/D03HTML/FLOSSPOLS-D03%20local%20governments%20
survey%20reportFINAL.html>.
76.	 MERIT,	“Results	and	Policy	Paper	from	Survey	of	Government	Authorities	FLOSSPols,”	supra	note	75	at	p.	16.
77.	 MERIT,	“Results	and	Policy	Paper	from	Survey	of	Government	Authorities	FLOSSPols,”	supra	note	75	at	p.	49.
78.	 MERIT,	“Results	and	Policy	Paper	from	Survey	of	Government	Authorities	FLOSSPols,”	supra	note	75	at	p.	50.
79.	 See	Cass	R.	Sunstein,	“Why	Does	the	American	Constitution	Lack	Social	and	Economic	Guarantees?”	no.	
36, University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper	(January	2003),	<http://www.law.
uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/resources/36.crs.constitution.pdf	>.
80.	 See	Rishab	Aiyer	Ghosh,	“Free/Libre/Open	Source	Software	in	Government,”	presentation	at	EuroOSCON	
(Amsterdam, 18 October	2005),	<http://www.flossproject.org/papers/20051018/RishabGHOSH-eurooscon-
flossgovt.pdf>	at	p.	9.
81.	 Ministero	per	l’Innovazione	e	le	Tecnologie, Istituzione della Commissione per il software a codice sorgente 
aperto —“open source”—nella Pubblica Amministrazione, ministerial	decree	(ITA,	31	October	2002),	
<http://www.cnipa.gov.it/site/_files/os_Decreto%20MIT%2031%20ottobre%202002_c.pdf>.
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single	provider,	 elevated	 reusability,	 [and]	 accessibility	 to	 the	 small	 realities	 of	
development.”82
	 Similarly,	 the	 french	 government	 has	 not	 adopted	 any	 assertively	
preferential	policy	either.	however	by	2002,	 the	agence	pour	 les	 technologies	
de	l’information	et	de	la	communication	dans	l’administration	(aTica)	issued	its	
guidelines	 on	 fLOSS.	 in	 that	 document,	 the	 agency	 expressly	 observed	 that	
the	fLOSS	movement	is	not,	 in	essence,	only	a	pragmatic	movement,	but	that	
sharing	code	also	has	a	cooperative approach,	which	is	based	on	the	desire to	
pool software.83
	 finally,	it	is	worth	noting	the	movement	in	Spain,	where	the	use	of	fLOSS	
in	the	public	service	has	been	the	most	extensive	in	europe	and	has	culminated	
with	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 international	 network	 of	 Public	 administrations	 for	
free	Software.	The	statement	of	principles	of	this	network,	supported	by	public	
figures	 of	 the	 calibre	 of	 vinton	cerf,	Manuel	castells,	 Pamela	 Samuelson	 and	
Pekka	 himanen,	 among	 others,	 is	 recorded	 in	 the	 Barcelona Declaration	 for 
the Advance of Free Software.84	 That	 declaration,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 european	
commission	justifications,85	also	acknowledges	several	dimensions	that	present	
challenges	 and	 opportunities	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 fLOSS	 by	 governments,	
namely	in	academic,	technical,	social,	legal,	and	voluntary	areas.	The	Declaration	
has	 been	 adopted	 by	 several	 local	 and	 national	 governments,	 abroad	 and	 in	
the	 eU,	 including	 the	Brazilian	 federal	 government	 and	 some	of	 its	 state	 and	
city	 governments,	 the	argentinian	 federal	 iT	 agency,	 the	 Peruvian	Ministry	 of	
education,	some	italian	localities,	such	as	the	Province	of	rome	and	the	region	of	
Toscana,	the	Spanish	Ministry	for	Public	administration,	and	many	governments	
of	localities	in	Spain,	such	as	catalonia,	andalusia,	valencia,	Madrid,	Barcelona,	
and	the	“extraordinary	extremadura.”86
82.	 Ministero	per	l’Innovazione	e	le	Tecnologie,	“L’Open	Source,” (ITA,	20	February	2004),	available	at	Internet 
Archive,	<http://web.archive.org/web/20061209055545/http://www.innovazione.gov.it/ita/egovernment/
infrastrutture/open_source.shtml>.	
83.	 Agence	pour	les	technologies	de	l’information	et	de	la	communication	dans	l’administration,	“Guide	de	choix	
et	d’usage	des	licences	de	logiciels	libres	pour	les	administrations,	“ (FRA,	December	2002),	<http://
synergies.modernisation.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Guide_LLL-2.pdf>	at	p.	6:
	 L’émergence	des	logiciels	libres	repose	sur	un	phénomène	simple	:	la	volonté	de	mutualiser	les	
logiciels.	Les	logiciels	sont	un	bien	essentiellement	immatériel	et	reproductible	à	peu	de	frais.	La	
mutualisation	 de	 leur	 développement	 est	 une	 approche	 naturelle	 pour	 réduire	 les	 coûts	 ou	
améliorer	la	qualité	d’un	logiciel	en	accroissant	son	caractère	générique,	sa	souplesse,	sa	richesse	
fonctionnelle	et	sa	modularité.	Cette	idée	de	mutualisation	est	à	l’origine	des	logiciels	libres.
	 ATICA	is	currently	known	as	Agence	pour	le	Développement	de	l’Administration	Électronique	(ADAE).	
84.	 See	International	Network	of	Public	Administrations	for	Free	Software,	Barcelona Declaration for the 
Advance of Free Software (18	May	2004),	<http://www.lafarga.org/xarxa/en/declaration>.
85.	 See	IDABC	European	eGovernment	Services,	Open	Source	Observatory,	“The	Many	Aspects	of	Open	
Source	Software,”	supra	note	67.
86.	 See	International	Network	of	Public	Administrations	for	Free	Software,	“Members,”	<http://www.lafarga.org/
xarxa/en/members>.	Spain,	as	noted,	has	been	widely	adopting	FLOSS	in	its	public	bodies.	In	addition	to	the	
Ministry	of	Public	Administration,	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	the	Ministry	of	Housing	are	also	large	scale	
FLOSS	adopters.	But	it	is	a	local	region	of	Spain	that	has	been	one	of	the	leading	cases	of	FLOSS	adoption	in	
Europe.	The	Region	of	Extremadura,	which	is	within	the	triangle	formed	by	Madrid,	Seville	and	Lisbon,	used	
to	be	the	poorest	region	in	the	EU,	but	it	has	raised	its	social	standards	with	the	use	and	deployment	of	
FLOSS.	As	a	result,	the	Region	was	granted	the	EU	Regional	Innovation	Award	four	different	times.	See	
Ghosh,	“Free/Libre/Open	Source	Software	in	Government,”	supra	note	80	at	p.	6.	See	also	Marson,	“Europe	
and	the	US	Philosophically	Divided	on	Open	Source?”	supra	note	65,	which	reports	that	its	policies	involved	
the	use	of	“Linux	on	70,000	PCs	and	400	servers	in	schools,”	as	well	as	the	deployment	of	“open	source	
operating	system	on	14,000	PCs	and	34	servers	at	hospitals	and	health	centres	across	the	region.”	
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the solId global movement towards	 the	 adoption	 of	 fLOSS	 in	 public	
administrations	can	be	convincingly	shown,	as	discussed	above.	Such	a	worldwide	
movement	does	not	 rely	upon	purely	objective	 factors.	 it	 shows	 that	even	 for	
those	countries	which	did	not	formally	mandate	the	adoption	of	fLOSS,	which	is	
most	of	them,	there	seems	to	be	a	sense	of	duty	with	respect	to	the	establishment	
of	guidelines	for	a	concrete	policy	of	migration.	it	does	not	seem	acceptable	in	
light	 of	 all	 the	 arguments	 presented	 that	 the	 status	 quo	 can	 continue,	 even	
though	the	arguments	in	support	of	fLOSS	adoption	often	seem	more	subjective	
and	 less	 pragmatic.	 The	 status	 quo	 cannot	 continue	 because,	 more	 than	 an	
“aspiration,”	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	is	grounded	on	a	deontological	argument.	
But	if	there	is	a	duty,	where	does	it	stem	from?
	 To	 get	 to	 the	 origin	 of	 such	 a	 duty,	 some	 mischievous	 metaphors 
must	first	be	dispelled.	These	are	frequently	raised	by	detractors	of	the	fLOSS	
movement,	who	seek	to	inculcate	in	stakeholders	a	sort	of	prejudice	against	the	
adoption	of	programs	licensed	in	a	less	restrictive	regime.	Their	intent	is	to	paint	
free	software	communities	as	groups	of	fundamentalists,	whose	ideologies	are	a	
strange	assemblage	of	religion	with	communism,	backed	by	a	precarious	 legal	
strategy.	
	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 fLOSS	 movement	 is	 frequently	 described	 as	
quasi-religious.	 The	 community	 is	 portrayed	 as	 sharing	 fundamentalist	 and	
dogmatic	values	which	are	often	associated	with	 religious	sects.	The	 image	of	
richard	 Stallman	 posing	 as	 Saint	 ignUcius87	 is	 emblematic	 of	 this	 claim	 and	
undermines	 the	movement	 being	 regarded	more	 seriously.	 The	 opponents	 of	
fLOSS	usually	describe	 the	group	as	characterized	by	an	 ideology	of	poverty,	
suffering,	and	aspiration,	and	thus,	as	antagonistic	to	every	possibility	of	profit	
or	marketability.88	Other	times,	fLOSS	developers,	and	all	those	opposed	to	an	
unlimited	strengthening	of	the	intellectual	property	system,	are	also	portrayed	as	
a	group	of	unabashed	communists	who	want	to	eliminate	any	sort	of	incentive	
for	 innovation.	heading	the	offensive	against	open	access	defenders	 is	 former	
Microsoft	President,	Bill	gates,	who	stated	in	an	interview	in	2005,	“[t]here	are	
some	new	modern-day	sort	of	communists	who	want	to	get	rid	of	the	incentive	
for	musicians	and	moviemakers	and	software	makers	under	various	guises.	They	
don’t	 think	 that	 those	 incentives	 should	 exist.”89	 This	 declaration	 caused	 the	
prompt	reply	of	richard	Stallman,	who	sharply	observed	that,	if	this	were	true,	
then	“an	open	internet	with	protocols	anyone	can	implement”	would	also	be	
87.	 See	Williams,	Free as in Freedom,	supra	note	13	at	p.	116.
88.	 At	this	point	the	free	software	and	the	open	source	movements	would	split.	The	latter,	as	seen	above,	
would	be	based	upon	the	idea	that	the	values	of	openness	and	freedom	must	be	voluntarily	assumed	by	
users	and	developers,	and	not	be	the	object	of	a	duty	to	be	assimilated	by	means	of	a	catechetical	process.	
Sam	Williams	tells	the	story	of	a	conference	in	which	Stallman	and	Linus	Torvalds	spoke	together,	and	
Torvalds	admitted	that	he	was	a	fan	of	Microsoft’s	PowerPoint	program.	“From	the	perspective	of	old-line	
software	purists,	it	was	like	a	Mormon	bragging	in	church	about	his	fondness	of	whiskey.	From	the	
perspective	of	Torvalds	and	his	growing	band	of	followers,	it	was	simply	common	sense.	Why	shun	worthy	
proprietary	software	programs	just	to	make	a	point?	Being a hacker wasn’t about suffering, it was about 
getting the job done.”	See	Williams,	Free as in Freedom,	supra	note	13	at	p.	157	(emphasis	added).
89.	 Michael	Kanellos,	“Gates:	Restricting	IP	rights	is	Tantamount	to	Communism,” (6	January	2005)	ZDNet UK,	
<http://www.zdnet.co.uk/insight/software/windows/0,39020478,39183197,00.htm>.
	 Software	Procurement	under	the	Democratic	Principle	 99(2008)	5:1&2	UOLTJ	79
communism—and	communism	supported	by	that	famous	communist	agent:	the	
US	Department	of	Defense.90
	 neither	 the	 metaphors	 of	 religious	 zealots	 nor	 communists	 captures	
what	 the	fLOSS	movement	 really	 is:	a	movement	 for	 rights	 that	 is	completely	
intertwined	with	the	democratic	principle.	as	such,	i	suggest	a	third	metaphor,	
one	that	compares	the	gPL	to	a	constitution.	Maureen	O’Sullivan,	Senior	Lecturer	
and	respected	advocate	of	the	fLOSS	movement	in	europe,	explains	the	quasi-
constitutional	facet	of	the	gnU	gPL:	
The	gnU	gPL	 is	a	 rather	 loquacious	 licence,	which	 includes	an	aspirational	
preamble	closely	resembling	that	of	many	constitutions	and	laden	with	moral	
prescription.	whereas	 constitutions	 often	 profess	 to	 take	 their	 cue	 from	 a	
heavenly	body,	the	gnU	gPL	hones	in	on	a	devilish	icon	to	be	eschewed	at	
all	 costs:	 that	 being	 the	 archetypal	 proprietary	 software	 licence.	 [...]	 The	
Preamble	 holds	 as	 its	 ideal	 the	 freedom	 of	 its	 users	 and	 “territory”	 from	
colonisation.	it	is	an	assertion	of	the	sovereignty	of	open	source	participants	
against	those	who	refuse	to	reveal	their	source	code	and	appears	to	operate	
within	a	defined	on-line	territory.91
	 indeed,	one	might	suggest	that	the	gPL,	with	respect	to	the	values	that	
are	reflected	in	its	text,	worked	by	acknowledging	the	actual	relation	of	forces	
within	the	free	software	community,	that	which	the	late	ferdinand	Lassalle,	in	a	
famous	speech,	identified	as	the	essence	of	all	constitutions.92	it	reflected	those	
values	which	the	community	perceived	as	inalienable	rights.	as	richard	Stallman	
points	out	in	Free Software, Free Society:	
The	goal	of	gnU	was	to	give	users	freedom,	not	 just	to	be	popular.	So	we	
needed	 to	 use	 distribution	 terms	 that	 would	 prevent	 gnU	 software	 from	
being	turned	into	proprietary	software.	The	method	we	use	is	called	copyleft.	
[…]The	central	idea	of	copyleft	is	that	we	give	everyone	permission	to	run	the	
program,	 copy	 the	 program,	modify	 the	 program,	 and	 distribute	modified	
versions—but	not	permission	to	add	restrictions	of	their	own.	Thus,	the crucial 
freedoms that define “free software”	are	guaranteed	to	everyone	who	has	a	
copy;	they	become	inalienable	rights.93
90.	 Richard	Stallman,	“Bill	Gates	and	Other	Communists,”	(15	February	2005)	News.com,	<http://www.news.
com/Bill-Gates-and-other-communists/2010-1071_3-5576230.html>.
91.	 Maureen	O’Sullivan,	“Making	Copyright	Ambidextrous:	An	Expose	of	Copyleft,”	(2002)	3	Journal of 
Information, Law and Technology,	<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2002_3/osullivan/>	at	p.	7.	
In	the	same	sense,	Sam	Williams	quotes	ZDNet software	columnist	Evan	Leibovich,	who	observes	that	“[j]
ust	as	the	Magna	Carta	gave	rights	to	British	Subjects,	the	GPL	enforces	consumers	rights	and	freedoms	on	
behalf	of	the	users	of	computer	software.”		Williams,	Free as in Freedom,	supra	note	13	at	p.	111,	quoting	
Evan	Liebovitch,	“Who’s	afraid	of	the	Big	Bad	Wolves?”	(14	December	2000) ZDNet,	available	at	Internet	
Archive,	<http://web.archive.org/web/20070814060401/http://techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/
main/0,14179,2664992,00.html>.
92.	 “[T]he	 actual	 constitution	 of	 a	 nation	 lies	 in	 the	 real,	 actual	 relation	 of	 forces	 existing	 there,	 written	
constitutions	are	valid	and	stable	only	when	they	correctly	express	the	actual	relation	of	forces	in	a	society	[...].	
The actual relation of forces	in	a	given	society	constitutes	the	actively	operating	force	which	determines	all	
laws	and	juridical	institutions	of	this	society	in	such	a	way	that	they	cannot	be	other	than	what	they	are	in	their	
essential	characteristics.”	Ferdinand	Lassalle,	“On	the	Essence	of	Constitutions	(Speech	Delivered	in	Berlin,	
April	 16,	 1862),”	 (1942)	 3:1	 Fourth International	 25–31	 <http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/fi/
vol03/no01/lassalle.htm>	at	pp.	26,	31.
93.	 See	Richard	Stallman,	“The	GNU	Project,”	in	Joshua	Gay,	ed.,	Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays 
of Richard M. Stallman,	1st	ed. (GNU	Press,	2002)	17–32,	<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fsfs/rms-essays.
pdf>	at	p.	22	(emphasis	added).
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	 The	allusion	to	four	freedoms	(run,	copy,	modify,	and	distribute)	as	basic	
inalienable	rights	is	not	innovative,	recalling	former	american	President	franklin	
roosevelt’s	speech	to	congress	on	January	6,	1941,	known	as	the	“four	freedoms	
speech.”	 in	 his	 speech	roosevelt	 described	 four	 basic	 freedoms—freedom	of	
speech	and	expression,	freedom	of	worship,	freedom	from	want,	and	freedom	
from	fear—which	later	came	to	be	posited	in	the	Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,	whose	preamble	 foresees	 that	 the	“advent	of	a	world	 in	which	human	
beings	shall	enjoy	freedom	of	speech	and	belief	and	freedom	from	fear	and	want	
has	been	proclaimed	as	the	highest	aspiration	of	the	common	people.”94
	 even	though	it	would	be	quite	outlandish	and	unrealistic	to	state	that	the	
gPL	is	really	a	constitution,	the	gPL	is	like	a	constitution	in	the	way	that	fLOSS	
licensing	 schemes	 tend	 to	 reflect	 the	 actual	 relation	 of	 forces	 in	 society.	 To	 a	
great	extent,	these	schemes	mirror	the	societal	values	of	our	time,	our	general	
conception	of	the	good,	and	our	natural	perception	of	rights.	constitutional	and	
human	rights	are	certainly	much	more	adequate	metaphors	for	the	freedoms	of	
the	fLOSS	movement	than	any	prejudicial	references	to	religion	or	communism.	
raised	 to	 the	 broader	 scope	 of	 public	 policy,	 however,	 those	 same	 freedoms	
cease	to	be	mere	metaphors	and	actually	reflect	values	and	principles	that	should	
be	welcomed	and	fostered	in	a	democratic	regime.
	 in	light	of	these	values,	Sergio	amadeu	da	Silveira,	at	the	time	heading	
the	 Brazilian	 government’s	 public	 policies	 on	 fLOSS,	 stated,	 when	 sued	 by	
Microsoft	for,	among	other	things,	“excess	in	freedom	of	speech	and	freedom of 
thought”95:	
i’d	like	to	register	that	the	purchase	of	software	that	preserves	the	values	of	
openness	and	freedom	is,	for	the	Brazilian	government,	a	subject unavoidably 
connected to the democratic principle.	and	as	it	has	been	a	long	and	painful	
path	to	reach	our	current	democratic	developmental	stage	in	this	country,	we	
will	not	walk	out	[of]	our	fight.	if	democracy	is	a	value	full	of	ideology,	it	will
94.	 Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt,	“The	Four	Freedoms,”	Speech	to	the	77th	US	Congress	(6	January	1941),	
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm>.	Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,	G.A.	Res.	217	A	(III),	U.N.	Doc.	A/810	(United	Nations,	10	December	1948),	<http://www.un.org/
Overview/rights.html>	at	Preamble.		
95.	 Microsoft’s	suit	was	filed	because	of	declarations	of	Sergio	Amadeu	to	a	major	Brazilian	magazine	with	
respect	to	the	practices	of	software	vendors	in	the	proprietary	regime.	In	line	with	arguments	of	economists	
such	as	Shapiro	and	Varian,	who	wrote	about	the	technological	dependency	and	imprisonment	of	
companies	in	the	proprietary	regime,	Sergio	Amadeu	supposedly	made	a	comparison	between	the	
practices	of	Microsoft	and	those	of	a	“drug	dealer.”	For	Lawrence	Lessig’s	comments	on	the	case,	see	
Lawrence	Lessig,	“The	Local	Ordinance	We	Call	the	First	Amendment,”	blog	posting	to	Lessig’s blog	(18	
June	2004),	<http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/001983.shtml>	(emphasis	added).	For	a	translation	of	the	
complaint,	see	“Demand	for	Explanation	of	Microsoft	Informatica	Ltda,”	(7	June	2004),	available	at	Lessig’s 
blog,	<http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/msft_complaint.pdf>,	submission	to Microsoft v Amadeu	(BRA,	
Criminal	Court	of	the	District	of	Barueri,	State	of	Sao	Paulo).	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	some	years	before,	
at	a	conference	at	the	University	of	Washington,	Bill	Gates	himself	had	affirmed:	“Although	about	three	
million	computers	get	sold	every	year	in	China,	people	don’t	pay	for	the	software.	[...]	Someday	they	will,	
though.	And	as	long	as	they’re	going	to	steal	it,	we	want	them	to	steal	ours.	They’ll	get	sort	of	addicted,	
and	then	we’ll	somehow	figure	out	how	to	collect	sometime	in	the	next	decade.”	Reprinted	in	IDG.Net,	
“Microsoft	in	China:	Clash	of	Titans,”	CNN.com	(23	February	2000),	<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/
computing/02/23/microsoft.china.idg/>.	
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never	be	an	insignificant	value.	 if	democracy	 is	a	dream,	 it’s	the	one	dream	
this	country	will	never	wake	up	from.	The	future	is	free.96
	 Brazil	has	quite	a	paradigmatic	story	to	tell	with	respect	to	the	adoption	
of	 fLOSS,	 though	 not	 so	much	 for	 its	 dimension	 and	 organization,	 since	 the	
achievements	of	the	Brazilian	program	have	still	not	been	successfully	measured,	
and	 even	 within	 the	 government	 fLOSS	 policies	 have	 followed	 a	 somewhat	
discursive	organization.	Brazil	has	many	local	prefectures	adopting	laws	mandating	
the	use	of	fLOSS,	and	many	ministries	within	the	federal	government	that	have	
opted	to	migrate	towards	its	adoption.	Brazil,	however,	lacks	a	more	solid	legal	
framework	with	 respect	 to	 its	procurement	processes	 for	 contracting	 software	
services,	which	makes	it	particularly	subject to	lobbying	by	traditional	software	
vendors.	its	distinguishing	characteristics	are	that	since	2003	the	government	of	
President	Luis	inacio	“Lula”	da	Silva	has	been	seeking	to	create	a	national	policy	
which	 is	 declaredly	 based	 upon	 the	 democratic	 principle.	 as	 cukierman	 and	
Pinheiro	observe,	“[c]urrent	government	policies	 in	Brazil	are	 linked	essentially	
to	the	principles	of	freedom	as	expressed	in	free	software,	inseparable	from	the	
kind	of	democracy	that	the	nation	wants	to	establish.”97	
	 The	 Brazilian	 federal	 government’s	 reference	guide	 of	Migration	 to	
free	Software	(“guia	Livre”)	very	eloquently	states:	
in	the	end	the	government	will	always	have	before	 it	 two	different	ways	of	
contracting	 [software].	 One	 by	 which	 the	 government	 and	 its	 citizens	
preserve	more	rights—rights	inherent	to	Democracy—and	another	by	which	
government	 and	 citizens	 abdicate	 from	 those	 same	 rights.	 They	 are	 two	
different	models	of	contracting.	choosing	one	or	the	other	is	not	an	option	
for	the	government:	 it	 is,	actually,	a	duty.	The	government	has	the	duty	to	
contract	preserving	the	values	freedom	and	openness.	The	government	has	
the	duty	to	contract	in	the	better	way	for	its	citizens.98
	 with	respect	to	amadeu’s	declaration,	it	is	emblematic	that	it	followed	a	
statement	by	emilio	Umeoka,	president	of	Microsoft	in	Brazil,	who,	in	an	allusion	
to	 the	 time	when	Brazil	 restricted	 the	 importations	 of	 information	 technology	
goods	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 a	 competitive	 industry	 of	 its	 own,	 affirmed	 that	 if	
Brazil,	with	respect	to	fLOSS,	restricted	the	sector	again	like	it	had	done	in	the	
past	it	would	“wake up	and	be	dominant	in	something	insignificant.”	Umeoka’s	
declaration	also	noted	that	in	some	sectors	and	ministries	the	approach	would	be	
“much	more	ideological,	not	based	on	the	technical area.”99
96.	 Quoted	in	Alexandre	Silva	Pinheiro	and	Henrique	Luiz	Cukierman,	“Free	Software:	Some	Brazilian	
translations,”	(2004)	9:11	First Monday,	<http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_11/pinheiro>	(emphasis	
by	Pinheiro	and	Cukierman).	For	a	thorough	and	rich	analysis	of	the	FLOSS	movement	in	Brazil,	see	Julian	
Dibbell,	“We	Pledge	Allegiance	to	the	Penguin,”	(2004)	12.11	Wired Magazine,	<http://wired-vig.wired.
com/wired/archive/12.11/linux.html>:	“We	pledge	allegiance	to	the	penguin,	and	the	intellectual	property	
regime	for	which	he	stands.	One	nation,	under	Linux,	with	free	music	and	open	source	software	for	all.	
Welcome	to	Brazil!”
97.	 Pinheiro	and	Cukierman,	“Free	Software,”	supra note	96.
98.	 Casa	Civil	da	Presidência	da	República,	Comitê	Executivo	do	Governo	Eletrônico,	and	Ministério	do	
Planejamento,	Orçamento	e	Gestão,	“Guia	Livre:	Referência	de	Migração	para	Software	Livre	do	Governo	
Federal,” (BRA,	2005),		<	https://www.governoeletronico.gov.br/anexos/E15_469GuiaLivreV1.pdf/download	>	
at	p.	46	(author’s	translation).	
99.	 Reuters,	“In	Brazil,	Microsoft	decries	Linux	use,”	ZDNet News	(4	June	2004),	<http://news.zdnet.com/2100-
3513_22-5226503.html>.
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	 This	leads	back	to	the	differences	between	bureaucrats	and	officers	of	a	
democratic	government,	and	invites	the	question:	what	if	the	affected	technical	area	
is constitutional	theory	or	the	constitution	itself?	is	democracy	an	insignificant	value?	
is	it	a	dream?	is	democratic	ideology	an	evil	to	be	combated?	here	lies	precisely	
where	the	detractors	of	free	software	fail	to	reveal	what	is	wrong	with	government	
support	of	fLOSS	principles.	The	part	that	follows	will	try	to	show	why	this	is	so	by	
framing	the	question	of	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	by	national	governments	as	distinct	
perspectives	of	the	democratic	principle.	it	will	explain	from	the	standpoint	of	legal	
policymaking	 why	 governments	 should	 not	 only	 prefer	 using	 and	 fostering	 the	
development	of	fLOSS	programs,	but	undertake	this	as	a	duty.
*
5. A DeMOCrATIC FrAMeWOrk FOr evALuATIng AnD ADOPTIng FLOSS
5.1. The Democratic Principle, Technology, and Social Justice
as JJ gomes canotIlho,	 chair	 of	 constitutional	 Law	 at	 the	 University	 of	
coimbra,	explains	 in	his	 treaty	on	constitutional	 law	and	constitutional	 theory,	
Lincoln’s	 formulation	of	 a	 “government	of	 the	people,	 by	 the	people,	 for	 the	
people”	 is	 still	 the	most	 impressive	 synthesis	 of	 the	 essence	 of	 a	 democracy	
because	 it	establishes	a	positive	and	substantial	 justification	of	the	democratic	
principle,	and	not	a	merely	negative	and	procedural	defence	of	democracy	as	a	
means	for	selection,	destitution,	and	limitation	of	stakeholder	powers.100	in	this	
sense,	 the	 democratic	 principle	 would	 be	 inherent	 to	 an	 open101	 and	 active	
society,	a	society	that	grants	its	members	the	possibility	of	a	holistic	development	
of	 their	 personalities,	 in	 conditions	 of	 economic,	 politic,	 social,	 and	 cultural	
equality,	as	well	as	the	freedom	to	take	part	in	a	dynamic	political	process	where	
there	is	no	schism	between	government	and	governed,	but	actually	a	continuous	
interplay	between	them	throughout	all	the	dimensions	of	political	life.	it	is	thus	
a	principle	with	substantive	and	procedural	dimensions:	substantive	because	 it	
conditions	the	political	process	to	the	pursuit	of	certain	ends	and	to	the	fulfilment	
of	certain	values	and	principles	(for	example	popular	sovereignty,	observance	of	
the	human	rights,	pluralism	of	expressions,	and	democratic	political	organization);	
and	procedural	because	it	links	the	legitimization	of	power	to	the	observance	of	
certain	 rules	 and	 procedures.102	 in	 the	 words	 of	 canotilho,	 the	 democratic	
principle	 establishes	 itself,	 as	 a	 “form	 of	 life,	 form	 of	 rationalization	 of	 the	
political	 process,	 and	 form	 of	 legitimisation	 of	 the	 power.	 The	 democratic	
principle,	as	constitutionally	posed,	is	more	than	a	method	or	technique	for	the	
governed	choosing	the	government,	since,	as	a	normative	principle,	considered	
in	its	several	aspects	political,	economic,	social	and	cultural,	it	aspires	to	turn	into	
the	leading	impulse	of	a	society.”103
100.	 JJ	Gomes	Canotilho,	Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição	(Almedina,	2003)	at	p.	287	(emphasis	
added)	(author’s	translation).
101.	 Though	one	substantially	different	from	that	advocated	by	Karl	Popper.	See	Karl	Popper,	The Open Society 
and Its Enemies,	2d	ed.,	vol.	1	(Princeton	University	Press,	1971).
102.	 Canotilho,	Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição,	supra	note	100	at	p.	288–289.
103.	 Canotilho,	Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição,	supra	note	100	at	p.	288.	
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	 in	 the	 same	 sense,	 antonio-enrique	 Pérez	 Luño,104	 chair	 Professor	 of	
Philosophy	of	Law	of	the	University	of	Seville,	calling	for	a	rescue	of	the	original	
meaning	that	the	expression	rule of law	(“estado	de	Derecho”)	had	before	it	was	
influenced	by	legal	positivism,	at	a	time	when	natural	rights	were	considered	to	
be	a	revolutionary	threat,	explained	that	the	key	for	an	analytic	definition	of	the	
rule of law lies	in	showing	the	strict	relation	that	exists	between	its	ideological	
component	 and	 its	 technical-formal	 structure.	 its	 ideological	 component	 is	
generally	identified	with	the	quest	for	justice	(and	thus	for	the	human	rights	of	
freedom	and	equality),	while	the	main	objective	of	its	technical-formal	structure	
is	to	create	an	environment	of	legal	safety	for	the	development	of	the	activities	
of	the	state.105
	 in	 sum,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 say,	 first,	 that	 the	 democratic	 principle	 has	
ideological	 and	 normative	 content	 and	 can	 hence	 be	 addressed by	 different	
theories.	Some	prefer	 to	 identify	 this	 ideology	as	a	minimalist	one,	where	 the	
role	of	 the	 state	 is	merely	 to	preserve	negative	 rights	by	offering	 security	 for	
the	development	of	social	relations,	and	the	role	of	the	citizen	is	merely	to	vote.	
Others,	such	as	canotilho	and	Pérez-Luño,	identify	the	ideology	with	promoting	
social justice106	 and	 then	 contrast	 this	 theory	 of	 the	democratic	 principle to	 a	
mere	 negative	 or	 structural	 concept	 of	 democracy	 (that	 of	 the	 suffrage).	 The	
democratic	principle	 is	also	procedural,	but	 it	 is	much	more	than	this.	Second,	
by	understanding	the	democratic	principle	 in	a	positive	 fashion	as	 the	 leading	
impulse	of	a	 society,	one	needs	 to	understand	as	well	 that	 its	 values	must	be	
sensed	 in	 all	 dimensions	 of	 societal	 life,	 including	 the	most	 intense	 power	 in	
contemporary	society:	the	market.
	 it	 can	 thus	be	concluded	 that	markets	are	not	a	 strange	concept	 to	 the	
democratic	principle	and	to	its	ideals	of	social	justice.	as	Bruce	ackerman	points	out:
it	is	easy	to	view	“liberty”	and	“equality”	as	if	they	were	inexorably	at	war	with	
one	 another.	 easy,	 but	 a	 mistake.	 The	 great	 project	 of	 liberal	 political	
philosophy,	over	the	last	generation,	has	been	to	reject	the	false	dichotomy	
between	“leveling”	equality	and	“free”	markets	that	has	had	such	a	baleful	
influence	over	the	modern	mind.	The	challenge	has	been	to	reconstruct	the	
tradition	 of	 the	 liberal	 enlightenment	 to	 achieve	 a	 deep	 reconciliation	 of	
these	superficially	competing	ideals.107	
104.	 Professor	Pérez-Luño,	one	of	the	greatest	continental	European	authorities	in	human	rights	and	
jurisprudence,	is	also	a	European	pioneer	in	Information	Technology	Law	(“Derecho	de	la	Informática”	or	
“Diritto	dell’Informática”),	together	with	Mario	Losano	and	the	late	Vittorio	Frosini.
105.	 Antonio-Enrique	Pérez	Luño,	Derechos Humanos, Estado de Derecho e Constitución (Tecnos,	2001)	at	p.	243.
106.	 Let	me	express	that	by	social	justice	I	do	not	intend	to	reflect	Rawls’	understanding	of	justice	as	fairness.	The	
most	obvious	reason	is	that	here	I	do	not	advocate	a	framework	of	political	neutrality,	as	Rawls	would,	with	his	
understanding	that	“[j]ustice	as	fairness	[...	does	not]	try	to	evaluate	the	relative	merits	of	different	conceptions	
of	the	good.”	John	Rawls,	A Theory of Justice,	rev.	ed.		(Oxford	University	Press,	1999)	at	pp.	80–81.	For	an	
interesting	account	of	neutrality	in	Rawls	and	other	authors,	see	George	Sher,	Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism 
in Politics	(Cambridge	University	Press,	1997).	I	would	rather	suggest,	as	Joseph	Raz	did	in	his	The Morality of 
Freedom,	that	“there	is	nothing	[in	my	theory]	which	speaks	for	neutrality.	For	it	is	the	goal	of	all	political	action	
to	pursue	valid	conceptions	of	the	good	and	to	discourage	evil	or	empty	ones.”	See	Joseph	Raz,	The Morality 
of Freedom	(Oxford	University	Press,	1986)	at	p.	133.	As	it	focuses	on	values,	or,	more	particularly,	on	those	
values	which	it	understands	as	righteous	reasons	for	action,	this	article	professes	a	particular	conception	of	the	
good.	And	it	is	a	conception	of	the	good	which	would	be	very	unlikely	to	be	captured	by	Rawls’	idea	of	an	
original	position	of	equality	(where	human	ambitions	would	be	beautifully	covered	by	an	imaginative	veil	of	
ignorance).	State	intervention	in	the	market	(for	instance	by	using	its	purchase	power)	to	promote	wider	
avenues	in	which	knowledge	can	be	shared	against	traditional	defences	of	full	blooded	ownership	of	
intellectual	goods	is	certainly	not	something	which	a	liberal	neutralist	author	would	defend.
107.	 Bruce	Ackerman	and	Anne	Alstott,	“Why	Stakeholding?”	(2004)	32:1	Politics & Society	41–60	at	p.	41.
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	 in	the	same	spirit,	crawford	Macpherson,	in	a	visionary	essay	written	in	
1973	about	the	interplay	between	technology	and	democratic	theory,	argued	that	
the	western	concept	of	democracy	was	founded	on	an	individualistic	root	that	
restricts	democracy	to	a	political	concept,	and	“puts	a	high	value	on	individual	
freedom	of	choice.”108	That	is	to	say,	developed	upon	the	doctrines	of	Locke	and	
Bentham,	“[t]he	liberal	market	postulates	were	well	entrenched	before	the	liberal	
theory	was	transformed	into	liberal-democratic	theory.”109	hence,	according	to	
Macpherson,	the	entrenchment	of	market	postulates	“meant	the	entrenchment	
of	a	peculiar	concept	of	man’s	essence.	The	pre-democratic	 liberal	 theory	was	
based	on	a	concept	of	man	as	essentially	a	consumer	of	utilities,	an	infinite	desirer.	
“Man	was	essentially	a	bundle	of	appetites	demanding	satisfaction.”110	Between	
claims	 for	 equality	 or	 for	 security	 for	property,	 even	 an	unequal	 property,	 the	
liberal	market	postulates,	as	well	as	liberal	democracy,	would	have	no	doubts	in	
choosing	to	preserve	security.111
	 That	which	ackerman	acknowledges	as	 the	greatest	project	of	political	
philosophy	over	the	last	generation	is	argued	by	Macpherson	to	be	a	quest	which	
actually	 dates	 to	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 when	 different	 critics	 of	 the	 market	
morality,	 especially	 John	 Stuart	 Mill,	 sought	 to	 reconcile	 the	 values	 of	 liberal	
individualism	with	the	ancient	values	of	natural	law,	then	perceived	as	being	denied	
to	the	working	class.	The	idea	was	no	longer	to	conceive	man	as	an	infinite	desirer,	
whose	personality	could	unlimitedly	expand	over	the	personality	of	others,	but	to	
assert	“an	equal	 right	of	every	 individual	 to	make	the	most	of	himself.”112	Mill’s	
attempts	failed	in	practice.	as	Macpherson	argues,	“we	still	rely	on	the	capitalist	
market	incentive	of	a	right	of	appropriation,	no	longer	quite	unlimited	(for	our	tax	
structures	generally	set	an	upper	limit)	but	with	a	limit	so	high	as	to	be	far	beyond	
the	reach	of	most	men,	and	so,	for	them,	virtually	unlimited.”113
	 for	Macpherson,	 however,	 technology	 would	 present	 new	 possibilities	
for	demoting	that	mercantilist	concept	of	an	individual	as	an	infinite	desirer	and	
appropriator,	 or	 at	 least	 its	 justification.	 Such	 an	 idea	was	 initially	 conceived	 as	
necessary	 for	providing	 incentives	 to	engage	 in	 the	productive	process,	 turning	
people	 into	 labourers	 and	 consumers	 in	 the	 service	 of	 industrial	 activity.	 now,	
however,	 technology	 shifts	 that	 process.	 first	 because,	 “by	 releasing	more	 and	
more	time	and	energy	from	compulsive	labour,	[it]	allow[s]	men	to	think	and	act	as	
enjoyers	and	developers	of	their	human	capacities	rather	than	devoting	themselves	
to	labour	as	a	necessary	means	of	acquiring	commodities.”114	Secondly,	it	renders	
the	 idea	of	scarcity,	which	had	been	for	millennia	 the	general	human	condition,	
obsolete.	 in	contrast,	 technology	now	multiplies	productivity,	and,	 i	would	add,	
turns	the	centrality	of	our	economy	and	social	 life	into	the	unlimited	universe	of	
intangible	goods.	nonetheless,	as	Macpherson	acknowledges,	“we	are	in	danger	
of	having	[scarcity]	riveted	on	us	in	a	newer	and	more	artificial	form.”115	as	he	says:
108.	 Crawford	B	Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory:	Ontology	and	Technology,”	in	CB	Macpherson, Democratic 
Theory: Essays in Retrieval	(Oxford	University	Press,	1973),	24–38	at	p.		25.
109.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	26.
110.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	26.
111.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	26.
112.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	32.
113.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	33.
114.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	37.
115.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	38.
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[T]wentieth	 (and	 twenty-first)	 century	 technology	 will	 make	 possible	 the	
realization	 of	 the	 more	 democratic	 concept	 of	 man’s	 essence;	 but	 that	
technological	 change	 in	 our	 lifetime,	 if	 left	 to	 operate	 by	 itself	 within	 the	
present	social	structure	and	guided	only	by	our	present	ambivalent	ontology,	
without	a	conscious	reformulation	of	the	concept	of	man’s	essence	appropriate	
to	the	new	possibilities,	is	as	likely	to	prevent	as	to	promote	the	realization	of	
liberal-democratic	 ends.	 it	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 i	 regard	 the	 race	 between	
ontological	and	technological	change	in	our	society	as	fateful.”116
	 in	 the	 same	 spirit,	 Tambini,	 Tsagarousianou	 and	 Bryan	 explain	 in	
Cyberdemocracy	 that,	 on	 one	 hand,	 new	 media	 technology	 may	 provoke	 a	
“rebirth	of	democratic	life,”	with	the	opening	of	new	public	spheres.117	On	the	
other	hand,	however,	citizen rights	are	being	replaced	with	consumer	rights	in	a	
market	that,	if	left	to	its	own	devices,	will	ensure	that	“ideals	other	than	[its	own]	
have	a	minor	role	in	the	debates.”	it	seems	the	answer	to	the	questions	they	raise	
is	in	the	affirmative:	“are	we	witnessing	a	carve-up	of	new	market	possibilities	by	
telecommunications	service	providers	and	computer	firms?	an	attempt	to	make	
the	democratic	process	dependent	on	their	technology?”118
	 The	idea	that	we	should	democratize	markets	or	foster	the	promises	of	
technology	does	not	equate	to	a	communist	venture.	freedom	of	initiative	is	not	
an	 ideal	to	be	abolished,	nor	 is	the	market	per se.	what	contemporary	political	
theory	seeks	to	portray	is	that	the	classic	liberal-democratic	tradition	needs	to	be	
revisited	in	light	of	the	ideals	of	social	justice,	extending	the	democratic	principle	
through	other	venues	than	simply	that	of	the	election,	control,	and	destitution	of	
the	stakeholders.	Of	course,	different	conceptions	of	liberal	democracies	around	
the	world	exist,	 and	 they	are	 reflected,	 for	 instance,	 in	different	perceptions	of	
economic,	social,	and	cultural	rights.	american	and	continental	european	ideologies	
differ	in	this	respect,	and	this	does	not	make	europe	a	communist	redoubt.
	 and	so	it	happens	with	respect	to	fLOSS.	as	will	be	argued	in	the	parts	
below,	 the	 values	 shared	 by	 the	 fLOSS	 movement	 could	 be	 justified	 in	 many	
dimensions	under	the	democratic	principle,	if	one	had	an	extended	comprehension	
of	what	such	a	principle	aims	toward:	granting	an	equal	right	of	every	individual	
to	make	the	most	of	himself,	be	it	with	respect	to	exerting	the	share	of	control	on	
the	political	institutions,	fulfilling	cultural	self-determination,	enjoying	the	outputs	
of	 an	 ethics	 of	 solidarity,	 or	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 process	 of	 economic	 and	 social	
development	of	the	country	or	even	the	global	networked	society.
	 Some,	as	discussed	above,	seek	to	paint	(and,	here,	welcome)	the	quest	
for	 fLOSS	 as	 a	 communist	 venture,	 calling	 for	 the	 “[a]bolition	 of	 all	 forms	 of	
private	property	in	ideas.”119	Others	assume	that	free	software	is	just	an	expression	
of	the	bigger	framework	of	a	different	mode	of	production,	called	“commons-
based	 peer	 production,”	 which	 would	 benefit	 from	 a	 “systematic	 advantage	
116.	 Macpherson,	“Democratic	Theory,”	supra	note	108	at	p.	25	(emphasis	added).
117.	 Cathy	Brian,	Damien	Tambini,	and	Roza	Tsagarousianu,	“Electronic	Democracy	and	the	Civic	Networking	
Movement	in	Context,”	in	Roza	Tsagarousianu,	Damien	Tambini,	and	Cathy	Brian,	eds.,	Cyberdemocracy: 
Technologies, Cities and Civic networks (Routledge,	1998)	1–17	at	pp.	3–5.
118.	 Brian,	Tambini	and	Tsagarousianu,	“Electronic	Democracy,”	supra note	117	at	p.	8.
119.	 Eben	Moglen,	“The	dotCommunit	Manifesto,”	(January	2003),	<http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/
publications/dcm.html>	at	p.	7.
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over	markets	and	firms	in	matching	the	best	available	human	capital	to	the	best	
available	information	inputs	in	order	to	create	information	products.”120	whether	
one	would	align	more	to	the	right	or	to	the	left	in	the	debate	is	not	the	question	
that	 this	 article	 seeks	 to	answer.	 in	effect,	 i	do	not	 see	 the	“copyleft	 regime”	
as	intrinsically	rightist	or	leftist.	i	prefer	to	characterize	it,	following	O’Sullivan’s	
creative	 construction,121	 as	 ambidextrous.	 indeed,	 the	 fLOSS	movement	 is	 an	
attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 ideals	 of	 freedom	 and	 equality	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
information	age.	it	is	as	leftist	or	rightist	as	the	normative	or	ideological	values	
present	in	the	democratic	principle	itself.	it	is	a	movement	of	balance,	which	in	
most	cases	relies	upon	an	innovative	construction	(the	copyleft	clause)	to	invert	
some	values	of	the	current	imbalanced	intellectual	property	system,	promoting	
what	has	been	increasingly	recognized	as	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge.
	 an	eventual	intertwinement	of	fLOSS	and	the	democratic	principle	might	
define	the	comprehension	of	public	policies	concerning	fLOSS	as	deontological,	
and	thus	not	simply	as	an	aspiration.	as	soon	as	all	are	entitled	to	a	membership	
with	respect	to	the	democratic	system	and	that	states	should	obviously	promote	
democratic	values,	there	would	be	no	excuse	for	failing	to	adopt	fLOSS—unless	
in	 exceptional	 circumstances	 when	 higher	 harms	 to	 the	 public	 interest	 could	
stem	from	immediate	adoption,	or	cogent	public	policies	could	 justify	secrecy.	
as	expressed	 in	 the	Brazilian	guide	 for	migration,122	 as	between	 two	different	
contractual	 choices	 (fLOSS	or	 “proprietary”),	one	 that	grants	 to	 society	more	
rights	and	values	that	are	compatible	with	the	democratic	principle,	and	another	
that	extirpates	those	same	rights	and	values	from	societal	life,	there	is	not	a	stark	
moral	choice	or	even	a	choice	at	all;	there	is	only	a	duty.	That	division	which	exists	
between	open	source	and	free	software,	creating	an	aspirational	movement	from	
one	and	a	deontological	one	from	the	other,	could	not	take	place	with	respect	to	
the	question	of	embracing	democracy	or	not.123
	 Democratic	 principles	 are	 in	 general	 normative	 and	programmatic,	 as	
extensively	expressed	in	many	post-war	constitutions.	nonetheless,	democracy	
is	not	a	mere	emotional	experience.	even	 though	 it	may	also	have	a	sensitive	
dimension,	 democracy	 is	 much	 more.	 it	 is	 an	 objective	 goal	 to	 be	 pursued	
unremittingly.	 it	 is	 per se	 a	 program	 of	 government,	 a	 duty	 of	 care.	 The	
constitutional	 reflection	of	 the	democratic	principle	 is	perhaps	 the	closest	one	
can	get	to	the	grundnorm	of	a	country	–	the	source	from	which	all	other	 legal	
norms	and,	under	them,	policies	extract	their	validity.	Thus	when	a	constitution	
speaks	about	the	rule	of	law	or	about	democratic	rights,	it	is	not	just	saying	that	
this	is	good,	but	it	is	saying	that	this	is	due.
	 as	seen	above,	one	may	seek	to	draw	the	distinction	between	civil	and	
political	 rights,	 on	one	hand,	 and	economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 rights,	 on	 the	
other	 hand,	 to	 say	 that	 the	 latter	 category	 implies	only	 a	moral	 of	 aspiration,	
the	 obligation	 of	 a	 state	 “to	 take	 steps	 […]	 to	 the	maximum	 of	 its	 available	
resources,	with	 a	 view	 to	 achieving	progressively	 the	 full	 realization”	of	 those	
rights,	as	framed	in	the	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
120.	 Benkler,	“Coase’s	Penguins,”	supra	note	15	at	pp. 375,	444.
121.	 O’Sullivan,	“Making	Copyright	Ambidextrous,”	supra	note	91.
122.	 See	Casa	Civil	da	Presidência	da	República,	Comitê	Executivo	do	Governo	Eletrônico,	and	Ministério	do	
Planejamento,	Orçamento	e	Gestão,,	Guia Livre,	supra note	98	at	p.46.	
123.	 See	Fuller,	The Morality of Law,	supra	note	25	at	pp.	5–6,	11.
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Rights.124	Others,	however,	would	promptly	note	that,	with	respect	to	the	right	to	
access,	the	commitment	achieved	in	the	Tunis	round	of	the	world	Summit	on	the	
information	Society125	pontificated	that	Un	Member	countries:
shall	strive	unremittingly	[…]	to	promote	universal,	ubiquitous,	equitable	and	
affordable	access	to	icTs	[…]	everywhere,	to	ensure	that	the	benefits	are	more	
evenly	 distributed	 between	 and	 within	 societies,	 and	 to	 bridge	 the	 digital	
divide	 in	 order	 to	 create	 digital	 opportunities	 for	 all	 and	 benefit	 from	 the	
potential	offered	by	icTs	for	development.126	
One	may	still	add	to	this	the	fact	that	the	right	to	access	is	neither	merely	nor	
mostly	an	economic,	social,	or	cultural	right.	it	has	of	course	these	expressions,	
but	it	is	also	based	upon	a	full	commitment	to	achieving	the	democratic	principle	
in	all	dimensions	of	societal	life,	including,	as	demonstrated	above,	the	civil	and	
political	expressions	that	are	at	the	very	root	of	the	liberal	comprehension	of	the	
democratic	principle.
	 with	an	awareness	of	all	the	dimensions	of	the	democratic	principle	with	
which	the	fLOSS	movement	intertwines,	it	is	possible	to	disagree	with	arguments	
such	as	those	raised	by	David	S	evans	and	Bernard	reddy	in	a	study	developed	
by	the	cambridge,	Massachusetts-based	nera	economic	consulting	firm,	at	the	
request,	and	with	the	support,	of	Microsoft	corporation.	That	study,	criticizing	
arguments	of	Lawrence	Lessig	in	support	of	the	obligatory	adoption	of	fLOSS	
by	 governments,	 favoured	 an	 objective	 approach	 to	 fLOSS.	 in	 its	 economic	
analysis	of	governmental	intervention	on	the	software	market,	the	study	began	
by	invoking	postulates	of	modern	economics	and	authors,	such	as	adam	Smith,	
to	 defend the	 propositions that	 “market	 forces	 generally	 do	 a	 rather	 good	
job	by	 themselves	at	maximizing	 social	welfare”127	 and	 that	 the	 fact	 that	“the	
124.	 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	(16	December	1966),	<http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm>,	993	United Nations Treaty Series	3	(entered	into	force	3	January	1976)	at	
art.	2.1.	Nonetheless,	there	is	a	great	discussion	concerning	the	justiciability	of	those	rights	(see,	for	
instance,	Henry	Steiner	and	Philip	Alston,	International Human Rights in Context:	Law, Politics, Morals,	2d	
ed.  (Oxford	University	Press,	2000)	at	pp.	275–300),	the	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	
of	the	United	Nations	(UN,	CESCR)	has	already	acknowledged,	in	its	General	Comment	No.	9,	that	“there	is	
no	Covenant	right	which	could	not,	in	the	great	majority	of	systems,	be	considered	to	possess	at	least	some	
significant	justiciable	dimensions.”	See	UN,	CESCR,	General Comment No. 09: The Domestic Application of 
the Covenant,	E/C.12/1998/24	(3	December	1998)	at	para.	10,	<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/4ceb75c
5492497d9802566d500516036?Opendocument>.
125.	 The	World	Summit	of	the	Information	Society	(WSIS)	was	established	by	the	Resolution	56/183	of	the	
General	Assembly	of	the	United	Nations,	on	21	December	2001.	Its	first	phase	was	held	in	Geneva	in	2003,	
with	the	objective	of	asserting	the	political	will	of	the	stakeholders	and	establishing	the	foundations	for	a	
pluralistic	Information	Society.	It	resulted	in	the	Geneva	Declaration	of	Principles	and	Geneva	Plan	of	
Action.	The	second	phase,	held	in	Tunis	last	November,	had	the	objective	of	putting	in	practice	the	Geneva	
Plan	of	Action	and	convening	on	solutions	for	the	realms	of	internet	governance,	finance	mechanisms	and	
follow-up	implementation	of	the	Geneva	and	Tunis	documents.	See	especially,	United	Nations,	Internet	
Telecommunications	Union,	WSIS,	Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,	WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6	(rev.	1),	
(18	November	2005),	
	 <http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html>.	As	reported	by	the	International	Telecommunications	
Union,	a	specialized	agency	of	the	UN	system	responsible	for	the	executive	secretariat	of	the	Summit,	
“nearly	50	Heads	of	state/government	and	Vice-Presidents	and	197	Ministers,	Vice	Ministers	and	Deputy	
Ministers	from	174	countries	as	well	as	high-level	representatives	from	international	organizations,	private	
sector,	and	civil	society	attended	the	Tunis	Phase	of	WSIS	and	gave	political	support	to	the	Tunis	
Commitment	and	Tunis	Agenda	for	the	Information	Society.”	United	Nations,	Internet	Telecommunications	
Union,	WSIS,	Basic Information: About WSIS (17	January	2006),	<http://www.itu.int/wsis/basic/about.html>.
126.	 United	Nations,	Internet	Telecommunications	Union,	WSIS, Tunis Commitment, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/7-E,	
(18	November	2005),	<http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html>	at	para.	18	(emphasis	added).
127.	 David	S	Evans	and	Bernard	Reddy,	“Government	Preferences	for	Promoting	Open-Source	Software:	A	
Solution	in	Search	of	a	Problem,”	(21	May	2002),	<http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=313202>	at	p.	52.
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market-generated	allocation	of	 resources	 is	 imperfect	does	not	mean	 that	 the	
government	 can	do	better.”128	 They	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 neither	 a	 reported	
market	failure	in	the	software	sector	nor	harmful	externalities	that	would	justify	
government	intervention.	The	reason	why	governments	intervene	would	be	thus	
purely	political,	and	not	grounded	on	any	technical	merits.	in	their	words:
as	users	of	software,	governments	face	daily	decisions	about	what	software	to	
use—decisions	that,	in	general,	are	no	different	than	the	decisions	that	must	
be	made	by	countless	private	firms	and	individuals	around	the	world.	when	
legislators	 get	 involved,	 however,	 these	 decisions	 have	 moved	 from	 the	
strictly	technical/economic	arena	to	the	political.	Much	the	same	is	true	when	
administrators	 set	 up	 special	 commissions	 to	 consider	 whether	 to	 institute	
government	policies	that	favour	open	source.	Decisions	based	on	the	merits	
would	not	need	such	special	commissions–private	firms	and	individuals	make	
their	decisions	without	commission	recommendations.129
	 fortunately,	governments	do	not	decide	purely	as	corporations;	if	they	
did,	they	would	probably	not	be	needed.	By	taking	a	broader	perspective	into	
account,	governments	must	pursue	that	which	is	the	general	conception	of	the	
good,	in	whatever	field	they	may	address.	nothing	which	relates	to	the	polis	must	
be	foreign	to	the	political	arena.	There	are	no	externalities	to	democratic	theory.
5.2. FLOSS and Cultural Democracy
as	 rod	 Dixon,	 Senior	 attorney	 of	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 education,	 very	
eloquently	explained,	computer	source	code	is	speech:
although	the	purpose	of	writing	source	code	is	not	to	draft	letters	to	lovers	
or	communicate	contractual	terms	that	may	bind	two	parties,130	source	code	
can	be	read	or	understood	by	computer	programmers,	computer	hobbyists,	
mathematicians,	 scientists,	 and	 other	 professionals	 who	 are	 trained	 in	 the	
particular	programming	language	in	which	the	source	code	is	written.131	
hence,	he	argues,	there	would	be	sufficient	grounds	to	protect	the	expression	of	
this	source	code	under	the	first	amendment	of	the	US	constitution.
	 if	computer	code	 is	 speech,	 it	 is	clearly	something	 that	 influences	 the	
definition	 of	 human	 identity,	 that	which	Manuel	 castells	 defined	 as	 “people’s	
source	 of	 meaning	 and	 experience.”132	 One	 may	 argue	 that	 up	 to	 now	 such	
influence	has	not	been	strong.	it	should	not	be	forgotten,	however,	that	computer	
software	is	not	so	old	an	invention,	and	that	digital	literacy	is	likely	to	increase	with	
128.	 Evans	and	Reddy,	“Government	Preferences	for	Promoting	Open-Source	Software,”	supra note	127	at	p.	55.
129.	 Evans	and	Reddy,	“Government	Preferences	for	Promoting	Open-Source	Software,”	supra note	127	at	p.	57.
130.	 I	would	differ	slightly	from	such	a	perspective,	in	the	sense	that	many	times	legal	relations	are,	indeed,	
instrumented	by	the	code	of	computer	programs,	which	are	designed	specifically	to	work	as	a	constraint.	
This	perspective	will	be	described	later	in	the	article	(see	part	5.4	below).
131.	 Rod	Dixon,	“When	Efforts	to	Conceal	May	Actually	Reveal:	Whether	First	Amendment	Protection	of	
Encryption	Source	Code	and	the	Open	Source	Movement	Support	Re-Drawing	the	Constitutional	Line	
Between	the	First	Amendment	and	Copyright,”	(2000)	1	Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 3	
<http://www.stlr.org/html/volume1/encryption.pdf>.
132.	 Manuel	Castells,	The Power of Identity:	Information Age, Economy, Society, and Culture,	2d	ed.	(Blackwell,	
2004)	at	p.	6.
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time.	in	a	nothing-forced	analogy,	one	may	think	about	the	assimilation	of	written	
literacy	throughout	history	and	about	its	privileged	status	over	many	centuries.	
One	may	also	analogize	code	to	law,133	and	conclude	that	even	though	not	every	
citizen	 is	 instructed	 in	 legal	 literacy,	 laws	must	be	written	 in	a	clear	way,	so	as	
to	be	understood	by	those	who	merely	want	to	study	it.	and	one	may	think	of	
several	institutions	that	were	created	by	law	and	that	spread	over	time	to	common	
understanding	and	defined	particular	characteristics	of	particular	societies134	that	
suddenly	happened	to	define	the	way	the	whole	world	was	established.	code	
is	 an	early	 science.	 its	 institutes	are	not	dominated	by	all	people.	at	 least	 for	
the	numerous	groups	that	up	to	now	have	been	joining	 in	the	communities	of	
software	development,	each	of	 those	having	 its	particular	 identity	and	sharing	
beliefs,	principles,	and	values	around	 lines	of	bits,	one	may	certainly	conclude	
that	code,	for	them,	is	their	identity.	if	we	turn	to	the	universe	of	academia	and	
business,	one	will	have	an	even	greater	account	of	the	possibilities	of	code	to	
define	individual	and	collective	sources	of	meaning	and	experience.
	 human	 identities	 are	 generally	 framed	 in	 a	 relationship	 of	 power.	 in	
castells’s	words:
the	social	construction	of	identity	always	takes	place	in	a	context	marked	by	
power	 relationships[...].	 [f]rom	 a	 sociological	 perspective,	 all	 identities	 are	
constructed.	[...]	[i]n	general	terms,	who	constructs	collective	identity,	and	for	
what,	largely	determines	the	symbolic	content	of	this	identity,	and	its	meaning	
for	those	identifying	with	it	or	placing	themselves	outside	of	it.135	
in	 this	process,	castells	 argues,	 language	holds	a	 fundamental	position,	 as	 an	
“attribute	of	 self-recognition,	and	of	 the	establishment	of	an	 invisible	national	
boundary	 less	 arbitrary	 than	 territoriality,	 and	 less	 exclusive	 than	 ethnicity.”136	
it	is	not	without	reason	that	many	constitutions,	to	some	extent,	devote	central	
articles	to	the	establishment	and	regulation	of	the	official	language	of	a	country.	
The	succinct	Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms	devotes	nothing	less	than	
eight	of	its	thirty-four	articles	to	the	official	languages	of	the	country.	walter	Ong	
tells	us	the	story	of	the	development	of	the	korean	alphabet,	which	was	decreed	
by	king	Sejong,	of	the	yi	Dynasty,	in	1443	aD.	Until	that	time,	there	was	not	a	
korean	way	of	writing	or	a	korean	identity	with	respect	to	their	written	culture.	
Due	to	the	power	of	the	yi	Dynasty,	and	to	Sejong’s	decree,	in	three	years	a	new	
alphabet	was	developed,	simplifying	the	korean	tradition	of	writing	with	chinese	
characters.137	
	 an	 imposition	 like	 this	would	be	 impossible	 to	accomplish	 today.	The	
symbolic	values	that	shape	the	development	of	a	culture	are	becoming	more	and	
more	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	a	few	big	market	players	that	monopolize	the	
construction	of	collective	meaning,	and	at	the	same	time	are	diluted	through	the	
fragmented	and	cacophonous	discourses	carried	out	on	digital	networks.	States	
133.	 See	especially,	Lawrence	Lessig,	Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace	(Basic	Books,	1999).	
134.	 For	a	formidable	account	on	how	the	identity	of	the	Roman	and	the	Greek	peoples	were	influenced	by	their	
laws	and	institutions,	see	Numa	Denis	Fustel	de	Coulanges,	The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws 
and Institutions of Greece and Rome	(John	Hopkins	University	Press,	1980).
135.	 Castells,	The Power of Identity,	supra note	132	at	p. 7.
136.	 Castells,	The Power of Identity,	supra note	132	at	p. 55	(emphasis	in	original	omitted).
137.	 Walter	Ong,	Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word	(Methuen,	1982)	at	p.	92-93.
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are	increasingly	turning	into	“nodes	of	a	broader	network	of	power.”138	in	such	
a	 network,	 they	 are	 just	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 system	 in	which	 individual	 identity	 is	
constructed	by	the	“enacting	authority	and	influence from	multiple	sources.”139
	 Below,	 some	 technological	 reasons	 are	 identified	 that	 demand	 that	
computer	programs	be	licensed	in	a	regime	of	freedom	and	with	access	to	their	
source	code.	what	i	seek	to	portray	here	is	the	potential	of	computer	programs	
to	impact	the	definition	of	human	identity,	the	very	meaning	of	human	beings	in	
their	 social	 relations	and	 in	 their	own	 reflection	of	 themselves.	Such	potential,	
even	if	one	focuses	simply	on	the	information	that	is	immediately	embedded	in	
the	source	code	of	computer	programs,	may	already	bring	an	extremely	powerful	
claim	 in	 support	of	 licensing	 in	a	 regime	of	 freedom.	even	 if	 the	 semiological	
content	of	computer	programs	may	seem	only	to	affect	programmers,	the	fact	
is	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 that	computer	 literacy	 in	 the	 information	age	may	expand	to	
capture	a	much	larger	number	of	people	than	we	can	presently	imagine.	further,	
the	 openness	 of	 computer	 programs	 is	 even	 more	 justified	 because	 their	
technological	architecture	may	frame	the	way	we	live	and	perceive	ourselves	and	
our	society.
	 for	this	reason,	george	greve,	President	of	the	free	Software	foundation	
europe,	criticized	Time Magazine	for	naming	Bill	and	Melinda	gates	as	Persons	of	
the	year	for	their	donations	of	computers	to	poor	african	children.	greve	argued	
that	 logically	 all	 the	 machines	 “are	 loaded	 with	Microsoft	windows,	 in	 other	
words	proprietary	software.	Like	all	proprietary	software,	it	remains	and	puts	the	
user	under	 the	control	of	 the	proprietor	of	 that	software.”140	Thus,	alluding	to	
gates’s	speech	about	piracy	in	china,141	greve	put	it	straightforwardly:	
what	 is	true	for	china	 is	also	true	for	africa.	So	 in	his	own	words,	what	Mr	
gates	is	doing	is	addicting	the	african	population	and	struggling	economy	to	
the	 products	 of	 his	 company.	 This	 sounds	much	 like	 the	 cigarette	 industry	
distributing	gratis	cigarettes.	Others	have	plainly	compared	it	to	the	model	of	
drug	lords.	and	since	little	children	always	look	good	on	Tv,	these	cigarettes	
computers	preferentially	go	to	schools	in	africa.142
	
	 what	is	clear	is	that	computer	programs,	not	only	by	the	content	of	their	
code,	but	also	by	their	functionalities,	increasingly	contribute	to	shaping	the	very	
meaning	of	people.	By	defining	the	modes	of	establishment	of	assorted	human	
relations,	those	who	write	computer	programs	design	the	interface	between	the	
individual	and	the	group	and	also	contribute	to	the	reflexive	construction	of	the	
self.	as	social	software,	which	Madison	defines	as	the	“technology	that	embodies	
evolving	social	patterns	[...]	[and]	heightens	the	salience	of	informal,	stable	online	
groups,”143	 computer	programs	are	a	 very	 relevant	part	 in	 the	construction	of	
democratic	discourse;	 they	are	 an	 important	 constituent	of	 the	public	 sphere.	
138.	 Castells,	The Power of Identity, supra	note	132	at	p.	357.
139.	 Castells,	The Power of Identity, supra	note	132	at	p.	357.
140.	 George	Greve,	“When	Doing	Good	Does	Bad,” in	Free Software Foundation Europe,	(22	December	2005),	
<http://www.fsfe.org/en/fellows/greve/freedom_bits/when_doing_good_does_bad>.
141.	 See	IDG.net,	“Microsoft	in	China,”	supra	note	95.
142.	 Greve,	“When	Doing	Good	Does	Bad,” supra note	140	(strikeout	in	original).
143.	 Michael	J	Madison,	“Social	Software,	Groups	and	Law,”	(2006)	Michigan State Law Review	153–191	at	p.	
158,	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=786404>.
	 Software	Procurement	under	the	Democratic	Principle	 111(2008)	5:1&2	UOLTJ	79
as	such,	they	must	not	escape	the	scrutiny	of	societal	control.	fLOSS	principles	
provide	for	individual	and	collective	control	of	democratic	significations	when	the	
semiotic	and	functional	values	of	computer	programs	are	kept	in	a	relationship	of	
freedom	where	parasitic	appropriation	is	not	allowed.	in	a	time	where	information	
and	culture	are	becoming	the	central	goods	of	political	life,	we	must	thus	speak	
of	a	democratic	culture	or	semiotic	democracy.
	 in	Digital Speech and Democratic Culture,	 Jack	 Balkin	 discusses	 the	
new	features	brought	to	the	nature	of	freedom	of	speech	by	digital	technologies	
in	 the	 information	 age.	 The	digital	 revolution,	 he	 argues,	 places	 this	 freedom	
in	a	new	light,	 rendering	possible	an	amplified	participation	and	 interaction	of	
individuals	in	the	construction	of	societal	meaning.	it	brings	a	democratic	culture	
into	existence,	according	to	Balkin,144	joining	the	choir	of	other	authors	such	as	
william	fisher,	 in	Promises to Keep,	and	John	fiske,	 in	Television Culture,	who	
speak	of	a	semiotic democracy.145
	 freedom	 of	 speech,	 Balkin	 argues,	 is	 an	 important	 ingredient	 in	 the	
constitution	of	human	personality	 in	the	information	age.	it	 is	a	process	that	is	
both	 interactive	 and	 appropriative,	 benefitting	 from	 the	 properties	 of	 routing	
around	(reaching	audiences	directly)	and	glomming	on	(appropriating	things	from	
the	mass	media	as	raw	material	for	new	creations),	and	which	thus	helps	people	
to	 influence	the	semiological	values	of	our	 time,	collectively	 taking	part	 in	 the	
definition	of	who	they	are.	however,	Balkin	also	presents	the	great	contradiction	
of	the	digital	age,	which	lies	in	the	twofold	nature	of	information.	indeed,	at	the	
same	time	that	new	information	technologies	aid	individual	participation	in	the	
cultural	 life,	 information	 is	 also	 an	 important	 source	 of	wealth	 for	 businesses,	
which	 seek	 to	 “[shut]	 down	or	 [circumscribe]	 the	 exercise	of	 [...]	 freedom	and	
participation.”146	 Trying	 to	profit	 from	 this	 twofold	nature,	media	 corporations	
invoke	the	constitution	both	to	 interpret	“the	free	speech	principle	broadly	 to	
combat	regulation	of	digital	networks	and	narrowly	in	order	to	protect	and	expand	
their	intellectual	property	rights.”147	That	raises	the	problem	that	traditional	free	
speech	doctrines	are	more	focused	on	a	restricted	understanding	of	the	political	
speech	 process	 and	 less	 on	 individual	 autonomy	 to	 take	 part	 on	 the	 cultural	
discourse.	a	democratic	culture,	Balkin	argues,	is	much	more	than	representative	
democracy.	it	is	linked	to	the	protection	of	digital	speech	as	“a	social	activity,	a	
matter	 of	 interactivity,	 of	 give	 and	 take,”148	which	 “creates	 new	 communities,	
cultures	 and	 subcultures.”149	 Thus,	 if	 free	 speech	 has	 to	 do	 with	 democracy,	
it	 is	 with	 a	 cultural	 democracy,	 with	 something	 far	 broader	 than	 the	 idea	 of	
suffrage	or	mere	“deliberation	about	issues	of	public	concern,”150	a	democracy	
that	favours	the	possibilities	of	“ordinary	people	[to]	gain	a	greater	say	over	the	
institutions	and	practices	that	shape	them	and	their	futures.”151	The	protection	
of	this	new	conception	of	freedom	of	speech	(and	democracy)	demands	also	a	
144.	 Jack	M	Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture:	A	Theory	of	Freedom	of	Expression	for	the	
Information	Society,”	(2004)	79:1	New York University Law Review	1–58.
145.	 See	William	W	Fisher	III,	Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment	(Stanford	
University	Press,	2004)	at	p.	28.	See	also	John	Fiske,	Television Culture (Methuen,	1987)	at	p.	95.
146.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech,”	supra	note	144	at	p.	15.
147.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech,”	supra	note	144	at	p.	24.
148.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech,”	supra	note	144	at	p.	34.
149.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech,”	supra	note	144	at	p.	34.
150.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech,”	supra	note	144	at	p.	34.
151.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech,”	supra	note	144	at p.	35.
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reinterpretation	of	the	role	of	governments,	which	are	called	upon	to	promote	
popular	participation	in	communicative	processes,	open	designs	that	are	suited	
for	societal	control,	and	the	enforcement	of	rights	against	censorship.	it	would	
also	be	necessary	to	change	a	rights-based	discourse	towards	a	perspective	of	
values.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 freedom	of	 expression	 should	be	protected	not	only	 in	
face	of	a	possible	violation,	but	as	a	process per se. More	than	this,	free	speech	
values—of	“participation,	access,	interactivity,	democratic	control,	and	the	ability	
to	route	around	and	glom	on”152—should	be	embedded	in	the	very	technological	
infrastructure	of	our	society
	 Thus,	when	choosing	between	fLOSS	and	proprietary	licenses,	between	
one	model	that	allows	for	the	control	of	cultural	values	by	the	very	people	that	will	
reflect	them,	and	another	model	in	which	the	process	of	collective	signification	is	
controlled	by	a	 small	 set	of	monopolist	 companies,	which	 license,	which	model	
should	the	state	embrace?	Should	the	state,	this	institution	whose	relevance	has	
been	increasingly	blurred	by	its	incapability	to	ensure	the	preservation	of	important	
values	for	life	in	society,	this	entity	whose	very	aptitude	to	govern	has	been	lost	day	
by	day	to	big	media,	this	fiction	of	which	even	the	procedural	meaning	has	been	
progressively	missed	in	the	democratic	process,	seek	to	regain	its	role	in	providing	
a	safe-harbour	for	the	development	of	human	identity,	or	should	it	definitively	give	
up	to	a	takeover	by	the	often	insensitive	forces	of	the	market?
5.3. A New Social Democracy: Law, Ethics, and the Emotions of FLOSS
Law,	in	being	just,	cannot	ignore	the	most	important	values	that	are	shared	by	
the	society	it	seeks	to	rule.	The	theoretical	separation	between	law	and	morality	
was	a	typical	characteristic	of	legal	positivism	and	of	the	particular	liberal	model	it	
intended	to	serve.	with	the	passing	of	the	twentieth-century,	whose	second	half	
was	marked	by	a	theoretical	reconciliation	between	the	law	and	societal	values,	
particularly	 following	 repulsion	 against	 the	 barbarities	 committed	 during	 the	
Second	world	war	under	the	“rule	of	law,”	there	is	no	more	room	to	ignore	that	
a	democracy	must	respect	the	ethics,	and	the	ethos,	of	its	time.
	 Unfortunately,	however,	and	very	paradoxically,	classic	liberal	values	are	
seemingly	being	revisited	by	the	unevenly	shaped	 intellectual	property	system	
of	 today.	 in	 response,	 as	 an	obvious	 signal	 that	 something	 is	 not	going	 right,	
peer-to-peer	file	sharing	networks	and	other	collaborative	movements	seem	to	
develop	as	an	 identity	of	 resistance	against	 those	dominant	 forces	which	have	
been	 forcefully	 legitimized	 by	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 anti-piracy	 campaigns	 carried	
out	 by	 advocates	 for	 the	 dominant	 intellectual	 property	 system,	 catechetical	
processes	 conducted	 by	 international	 organizations,153	 and	 education	 about	
intellectual	property	law seek	to	promote	an	ever	stronger	model	of	restrictions	
to	the	circulation	of	knowledge.	Such	model	runs	in	opposite	direction	to	the	new	
sharing	ethic	that	characterizes	social	processes	in	the	information	age.154
152.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech,”	supra	note	144	at	p.	54.
153.	 See	Pedro	de	Paranaguá	Moniz,	“The	Development	Agenda	for	WIPO:	Another	Stillbirth?	A	Battle	Between	
Access	to	Knowledge	and	Enclosure,”	(1	July	2005),	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=844366>	at	pp.	28	and	ff.
154.	 See	Andres	Guadamuz,	“The	‘New	Sharing	Ethic’	in	Cyberspace,”	(2002)	5:1	Journal of World Intellectual 
Property	129–139	at	p.	129.
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	 in	 “cyberlaw	 and	 the	 norms	 of	 Science,”155 Dan	 Burk	 raises	 a	 very	
interesting	example	of	how	the	internet	 incorporates	in	 its	constitution	the	set	
of	cultural	values	that	were	shared	by	the	scientists	who	conceived	 its	original	
characteristics.	he	claims	that	the	early	architecture	of	the	internet	reflected	the	
ideals	of	the	academics	at	that	time.	its	properties	of	being	a	means	for	sharing	
information	in	a	decentralized	and	non-hierarchical	fashion	reflect,	inter	alia,	the	
values	of	universalism	(being	impartial),	communalism	(building	a	commons	for	
the	free	interchange	of	information),	and	independence	(the	ability	of	the	scientist	
to	manage	his	own	research	schedule)	that	were	the	values	of	its	creators.
	 More	generally,	technologies	have	ethics,	which	are	the	ethics	of	their	
creators.	But	 a	 social	 ethic	 also	 comes	 to	exist	with	 the	 independent	 life	of	 a	
technology.	This	ethical	circle	expands	in	direct	correspondence	to	the	degree	of	
penetration	of	a	given	technology	in	society.	This	is	most	evident,	certainly,	in	the	
technologies	that	frame	the	cognitive	values	of	humanity,	that	is,	our	capacity	to	
understand	and	experience	the	world.	Oral	tradition,	and	oral	societies,	had	their	
own	ethics.	That	ethics	was	undoubtedly	changed	with	the	advent	of	the	writing	
culture,	which	suddenly	gave	to	the	world	the	capacity	to	conserve	information,	
revisit	it,	and	build	a	dialogue	based	on	the	transmission	of	the	ideas	in	a	more	
stable	 and	 precise	 way.	 The	 ethics	 of	 literacy	 was,	 and	 certainly	 is,	 an	 ethics	
substantially	different	from	the	ethics	of	orality.156
	 But	perhaps	the	ethics	and	the	ethos	of	this	world	have	never	experienced	
such	a	strong	transformation	as	the	one	that	arose	with	the	advent	of	information	
technologies,	and	particularly	with	the	advent	of	the	internet.	human	perception	
of	 time	and	space	was	suddenly	 thrown	 into	a	whirlwind	of	hyper-connections	
that	 radically	 changed our	 understanding	 of	 the	 world	 and	 of	 ourselves.	 The	
possibility	of	touching	the	globe	and	sharing	information	in	an	unprecedented	
dimension	caused	the	emergence	of	a	new	individual	and	a	new	ethic.	certainly	
the	world	is	changing,	but	a	revolution	is	also	occurring	within.	as	early	as	1987,	
in	L’Uomo Artificiale: Ettica e Diritto Nell’Era Planetaria,	vittorio	frosini,	wrote	
about	people	of	the	technological	age.	he	said:
The	man	 of	 the	 technological	 age	 is	 [...]	 different	 from	 the	men	 of	 all	 the	
generations	that	have	preceded	him	in	his	history,	and	not	only	because	he	is	
able	to	complete	enterprises	that	in	the	past	had	been	dreamed	of	but	were	
never	 believed	 to	 be	 possible	 (like	 the	 ubiquity,	 multiple	 long	 distance	
conferences,	 spatial	 flights,	 the	automated	thought);	but	above	all	because	
man,	able	at	the	same	time	to	communicate	with	all	the	other	men	living	on	
the	earth,	to	separate	himself	from	life	on	the	earth	and	to	move	in	the	world	
of	machines	created	by	men,	to	entrust	himself	to	the	machine	for	an	exact	
thought,	has become a new man just in his inner image.157
	 The	inner	image	of	these	new	individuals	is	not	an	image	of	complete	
autonomy.	individuals	of	the	information	age	project	themselves	as	a	node	of	the	
network	society.	at	the	same	time	that	they	struggle	to	preserve	the	individual	
155.	 See	Dan	Burk,	“Cyberlaw	and	the	Norms	of	Science,” Boston College Intellectual Property and Technology 
Forum	(4–5	June	1999),	<http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/commentary/content/burk.html>.
156.	 Ong,	Orality and Literacy,	supra	note	137.
157.	 Vittorio	Frosini, L’Uomo Artificiale: ettica e diritto nell’era planetaria (Spirali,	1986)	at	p.	8	(author’s	
translation)	(emphasis	added).
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values	 of	 their	 inner	 sphere,	 they	 feel	 an	 undeniable	 desire	 to	 expand	 their	
personality	towards	others,	towards	the	wider	spheres	of	collectivity.	for	instance,	
from	 the	 original	 conception	 of	 an	 absolute	 right	 to	 privacy	 as	 developed	by	
Samuel	warren	and	Louis	Brandeis	in	1891,158	humanity	came	to	an	age	where	
one	 speaks	about	 the	concept	of	an	 informational	 right	of	 self	determination.	
Such	a	right	 is	not	understood	as	merely	“an	 intra-subjective	value,	but	as	the	
self-determination	of	the	subject	in	the	context	of	his	relations	with	other	citizens	
and	with	the	public	power.”159	
	 indeed,	as	frosini	observes	elsewhere:
in	today’s	mass	society	the	principle	of	privacy,	such	as	it	was	conceived,	much	
as	a	puritanic	myth,	 in	an	era	characterized	by	the	strong	individualism	of	a	
rampant	capitalism,	is	no	longer	accepted.	[...]	[T]he	right	to	privacy	has	taken	
a	 new	 direction:	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 purely	 negative	 attitude,	 whereby	 an	
individual	tries	to	keep	other	people	from	interfering	in	his	private	life,	refuses	
to	allow	information	about	himself	to	be	circulated	and	renounces	society	(the	
old	 concept	of	 “to	be	 let	 alone”).	On	 the	 contrary,	 this	new	approach	 is	 a	
positive	one,	whereby	an	individual	affirms	his	freedom	and	dignity,	places	a	
limitation	 on	 computerized	 information	 power,	 and	 actively	 controls	 the	
means	and	the	ends	of	such	power.160	
it	is	the	perception	that	“both	solitude	and	companionship	have	a	part	to	play	in	
forming	human	awareness	to	be	a	man.”161	in	the	networked	society, freedom	is	
exercised	in	reciprocity.	it	is	not	being	free	of	the	others.	it	is	being	free	by	means	
of	the	others.162
	 as	 this	 new	 individual	 expands	 towards	 and	 through	 others,	 a	 very	
different	 society	 in	 its	own	 image	 is	 also	 formed.	 in	 “The	hacker	ethic	 as	 the	
culture	of	the	information	age,”163	Pekka	himanen	argues	that	if	we	can	speak	
of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 “Protestant	 ethic”	 and	 the	 capitalist	 ethic,	 as	
Max	weber	 did	 in	The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,164	 in	 the	
158.	 See	Samuel	D	Warren	and	Louis	D	Brandeis,	“The	Right	to	Privacy,” (1890)	4:5	Harvard Law Review	193–220,	
available	at	Louis D Brandeis School of Law Library,	<http://library.louisville.edu/law/brandeis/privacy.html>.
159.	 Antonio-Enrique	Pérez-Luño,	Manual de Informatica y Derecho (Ariel,	1996)	at	p.	43	(author’s	translation).
160.	 Vittorio	Frosini,	Law and Liberty in the Computer Age: The Harvard Papers	(Tano,	1995)	at	pp.	32,	34.
161.	 Frosini,	Law and Liberty in the Computer Age,	supra	note	160	at	p.	35.
162.	 Wolfgang	Hoffmann-Riem	[Justice	of	the	German	Supreme	Court],	“Liberdade	como	Autonomia	Recíproca	
de	Acesso	à	Informação,” transcribed	by Tércio	Sampaio	Ferraz	Jr,	in	Marco	Aurélio	Greco	and	Ives	Gandra	
da	Silva	Martins,	eds.,	Direito e Internet: relações jurídicas na sociedade informatizada (Revista	do	Tribunais,	
2001)	at	p.	242	(author’s	translation).
	 The	 right	 to	 informational	 self-determination	 is	 thus	 not	 a	 private	 right	 of	 defence	 of	 an	
individual	who	cast	himself	aside	of	society,	but	seeks	to	make	participation	in	communication	
processes	possible	to	anyone.	The	others	[human	beings]	constitute	the	social	environment	in	
whose	 limits	 the	 personality	 of	 each	 one	 expands:	 autonomy,	 and	 not	 the	 anomy,	 of	 the	
individual,	 is	 the	 image	 that	 directs	 the	Constitution.	 Autonomy	must	 be	 possible	 in	 socially	
connected	vital	spaces,	in	which	freedom	of	communication—or	better:	freedom	in	common—
cannot	be	oriented	towards	a	concept	that	limits	the	protection	to	a	self-centered	protection,	
but	needs	to	be	understood	as	the	exercise	of	 freedom	in	reciprocity.	This	 freedom	does	not	
mean	 being	 free	 from the	 others,	 but	 being	 free	 by means of	 the	 others.	 In	 modern	
communication	relations	the	idea	of	the	extension	of	freedom in reciprocity presents	itself	in	an	
expressive	fashion.
163.	 Pekka	Himanen,	“The	Hacker	Ethic	as	the	Culture	of	the	Information	Age,” in	Manuel	Castells,	ed., The 
Network Society: a Cross-Cultural Perspective	(Elgar,	2004)	420–431.
164.	 Max	Weber,	The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,	trans.	Talcott	Parsons,	2nd	ed.	(Scribner,	1930),	
<http://www.archive.org/stream/protestantethics00webe/protestantethics00webe_djvu.txt>.	See	extensive	
reference	to	Max	Weber’s	works	in	Himanen,	“The	Hacker	Ethic,”	supra note	163	at	pp.	420–421,	427–428.
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information	age	we	can	talk	about	the	relation	between	“the	hacker	ethic”	and	
the	ethic,	or	the	“work	culture,”	of	our	time.165	The	network	society,	he	clarifies,	
is	still	a	capitalist	society.	But	 its	ethic	 is	of	a	passion	for	creation	and	for	self-
development	and	of	a	different	relationship	with	time	and	money.	he	identifies	
this	new	culture	with	the	culture	of	hackers	(not	the	criminals,	but	the	“heroes	
of	 the	 computer	 revolution,”	 as	 described	 by	 Steven	 Levy166).	 The	 networked	
structure	of	contemporary	society,	the	importance	that	the	values	of	openness	
and	sharing	assume,	and	the	willingness	to	play,	explore,	create,	and	share,	reflect	
this	positive	attitude	of	the	individual	towards	technology	and	others.	
	 hence,	 from	 whatever	 perspective	 one	 examines	 contemporary	
society—be	it	the	inner	image	of	an	individual	or	the	culture	of	the	information	
age—those	properties	to	which	Burk	referred	engendered	the	development	of	
a	new	morality. it	 is	a	new	morality	 that	 is	extremely	different	 from	those	that	
preceded	it	and	which	thus	has	to	be	treated	differently,	and	not	necessarily	in	an	
analogous	way.	The	conclusion	is	that	the	law	ought	to	have	a	responsive	attitude	
towards	the	moral	values	of	today’s	society,	and	that	this	responsive	attitude	will	
not	be	fulfilled	by	bringing	the	rule	of	law	to	an	amoral	expression.	neither	legal	
positivism	nor	 scientific	positivism	 can	be	desired	goals	 if	we	want	 to	protect	
individual	and	collective	values.	Legal	positivism	is	the	highest	ambition	of	those	
who	 believe	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	 segregating	 law	 from	 the	 universe	 of	 moral	
reasoning;	scientific	positivism	is	the	conception	of	those	who	think	that	society	
can	be	governed	by	the	universal	values	of	science.	They	are	similar	in	the	end:	
both	forget	that	morality	is	always	there,	and	that	law,	state,	and	society	are	not	
dissociable	structures.
	 in	 September	 2003,	 a	 study	 conducted	 by	 the	 Stanford	 institute	 for	
economic	Policy	research	(SiePr)	under	the	direction	of	Professor	Paul	a	David167	
concluded	that	the	motivation	for	developing	fLOSS	was	rarely	based	on	economic	
reasons.	The	results	of	a	survey	concluded	that	77.8%	of	the	developers	deemed	
returning	 derivative	 works	 they	 created	 to	 the	 community	 of	 developers	 as	
important	or	very	important;	68.6%	of	the	respondents	also	pointed	to	promotion	
of	the	fLOSS	mode	of	development	as	a	reason	to	take	part	in	the	movement.168	
in	another	study,	conducted	by	the	MiT	Sloan	School	of	Management,	Lakhani	
and	 wolf	 show	 that	 a	 “central	 issue	 in	 f/OSS	 [free/Open	 Source	 Software]	
research	has	been	the	motivations	of	developers	to	participate	and	contribute	to	
the	creation	of	a	public	good.	The	effort	expended	is	substantial.	individuals	on	
average	contribute	14	hours	per	week.”169
	 This	raises	the	question,	what	kind	of	ethics	should	governments	seek	to	
foster	in	a	democratic	society?	Should	it	be	the	emulative	ethic	of	the	proprietary	
165.	 Himanen,	“The	Hacker	Ethic,”	supra note	163	at	pp.	421,	424.
166.	 Stephen	Levy,	Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution,	1st	ed.	(Dell,	1984).	
167.	 Paul	Allan	David	is	Professor	of	Economics	and	Senior	Fellow	of	the	Institute	for	Economic	Policy	Research	
at	Stanford	University.	He	is	Professor	Emeritus	of	Economics	and	Economic	History	in	the	University	of	
Oxford,	where	he	is	also	an	Emeritus	Fellow	of	All	Souls	College,	and	currently	Senior	Fellow	of	the	Oxford	
Internet	Institute.	
168.	 Paul	Allan	David,	Andrew	Waterman,	and	Seema	Arora,	“FLOSS-US:	The	Free/Libre/Open	Source	Software	
survey	for	2003,”	Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research	(September	2003),	
	 <http://www.stanford.edu/group/floss-us>	at	p.	18.
169.	 Karim	R	Lakhani	and	Robert	G	Wolf,	“Why	Hackers	do	What	They	Do:	Understanding	the	Motivation	Effort	in	
Free/Open	Source	Software	Projects”	in	Joseph	Feller	et al.,	eds.,	Perspectives on Free and Open Source 
Software (MIT	Press,	2005)	3–21,	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=443040>	at	pp.	18–19.	
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system	or	the	ethic	of	sharing	and	solidarity	which	seems	to	inspire	the	fLOSS	
movement?	 in	arranging	a	procurement	process	when	 it	 is	possible	 to	choose	
between	those	two	different	models,	are	there	grounds	to	affirm	that	one	or	the	
other	fits	better	into	the	democratic	principle?	
	 choosing	to	embrace	the	particular	ethic	of	a	collaborative	movement	
is	 not	 an	unprecedented	event	 in	 history.	an	 interesting	example	 is	 raised	by	
robert	Merges.	 in	“from	Medieval	guilds	 to	Open	Source	Software,” Merges	
shows	 how	 states	 in	 a	 given	moment	 ratified	 the	 statutes	 of	medieval	 guilds,	
recognizing	 “norms	 [which]	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 [had	 been]	 generated	 by	 the	
members	 in	 response	 to	 the	needs	and	demands	of	specific	 technologies	and	
industries.”170	 analogizing	 guilds	 and	 the	 open	 source	 movement,	 Merges	
explains	that	both	depended	upon	norms	that	were	shared	within	communities	
and	 had	 a	 bottom-up	 origin	 and	 that	 those	 norms	 reflected	 shared	 values	
concerning	what	could	be	appropriated	by	the	members	of	the	community.	Both	
guilds	and	fLOSS	are	“groups	of	technologists	in	which	the	work	of	individuals	
has	been	amplified	by	sharing	and	combination	with	others	in	the	group.”171	Both	
are	“clear	embodiments	of	[a]	collective	spirit.”172
	 another	question	that	could	be	asked	is	whether	there	is	a	particular	kind	
of	emotion	that	should	be	shared	in	a	democratic	state.	Should	states	care	about	
what	sort	of	emotions	are	flourishing	in	its	society?	and,	in	this	sense,	would	the	
fLOSS	model	 rely	on	particular	motivations	 that	better	fit	 into	the	democratic	
principle?	These	questions	may	seem	strange,	and	excessively	abstract,	but	there	
is	a	growing	field	in	legal	theory	dedicated	to	the	study	of	the	interplay	between	
law	and	emotions.	as	rachel	Moran	observes:
no	matter	how	law	struggles	to	evade	the	truth	of	emotion,	feelings	persist.	
for	though	they	cannot	be	reduced	to	lofty	abstractions,	they	are	the	essence	
of	daily	life.	They	endure	and	make	us	human	in	our	everyday	suffering	and	
our	 illogical	 hope.	 [...]	 The	 power	 of	 authentic	 emotion,	 as	 much	 as	 and	
perhaps	 even	more	 so	 than	 the	 authority	 of	 law,	 holds	 out	 the	promise	of	
shared	humanity	and	an	escape	from	hierarchy.173
	 in	“Law	and	the	emotions,”	eric	Posner	argues	that	“[o]ne	reason	for	the	
neglect	of	emotions	in	legal	theory	may	be	that	the	dominant	strains	of	normative	
legal	theory—economic	analysis,	moral-philosophical	analysis,	and	constitutional	
analysis—rely	on	methodologies	that	are	not	well	suited	to	analyzing	emotion.”174	
however,	“[b]y	changing	payoffs	from	behavior	taken	in	emotion	states,	the	law	
can	 influence	 both	 incentives	 in	 the	 emotion	 state	 and	 incentives	 to	 cultivate	
desirable	emotional	dispositions.”175	he	further	argues	that	“[f]ear,	disgust,	and	
the	other	emotions	all	 have	 their	different	 idiosyncrasies,	 and	a	well-designed	
170.	 Robert	P	Merges,	“From	Medieval	Guilds	to	Open	Source	Software:	Informal	Norms,	Appropriability	
Institutions,	and	Innovation,”	(13	November	2004),	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543>	at	p.	12.
171.	 Merges,	“From	Medieval	Guilds	to	Open	Source	Software,”	supra	note	170	at	p.	22	(emphasis	added).
172.	 Merges,	“From	Medieval	Guilds	to	Open	Source	Software,”	supra	note	170	at	p.	22.
173.	 Rachel	F	Moran,	“Law	and	Emotion,	Love	and	Hate,”	(2000)	11:2	Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues	747–
784	at	p.	784.	See	also	Susan	A	Bandes,	ed.,	The Passions of Law	(New	York	University	Press,	1999);	Zenon	
Bankowski,	Living Lawfully: Love in Law and Law in Love	(Kluwer,	2001).
174.	 Eric	A	Posner,	“Law	and	the	Emotions,”	(2001)	89:6	Georgetown Law Journal	1977–2012,	<http://ssrn.com/
abstract=241389>	at	pp.	1977–1978.
175.	 Posner,	“Law	and	the	Emotions,” supra note 174	at	p.	1978.
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legal	system	exploits	them	differently.”176	The	 law	does	engage	with	emotions	
on	 matters	 ranging	 from	 restrictions	 on	 cigar	 advertising	 to	 the	 celebration	
of	 national	 (or	 humiliation)	 days.	 constitutional	 traditions	 value	 the	 pursuit	 of	
happiness.	There	is	some	controversy	on	the	extent	to	which	law	should	engage	
with	the	emotions	of	jurors.	in	all	these	matters,	it	does	make	sense	to	ponder	
on	how	(and	to	what	extent)	the	design	of	legal	institutions	may	elicit	emotions	
that	are	of	great	societal	significance.	in	our	case,	it	is	worth	pondering	on	the	
role	of	emotions	in	the	enablement	of	discourses	that	define	the	techno-political	
infrastructure	of	our	societies	–	and	that	‘enframe’	the	culture	and,	in	all	this,	the	
ethics	of	our	time.	The	design	of	proper	fora	for	the	establishment	of	democratic	
discourses	based	upon	and	 surrounding	 intellectual	goods	 is	one	of	 the	most	
important	tasks	for	21st	century	identity	politics	–	and	one	deeply	enrooted	on	the	
emotional	aspects	that	permeate	such	discourses.	These	need	to	be	addressed	
by	states	of	the	most	different	liberal	affiliations,	to	the	extent	that	such	states	
purpose	to	be	liberal	ones.
	 in	this	sense,	the	two	following	questions	can	be	asked.	first,	what	kinds	
of	emotions	would	be	more	beneficial	to	foster,	and	what	kinds	of	emotions	should	
be	avoided	in	a	democratic	society	in	relation	to	the	ways	we	and	our	governments	
deal	with	our	intellectual	creations?	when	we	look	into	matters	concerning	fLOSS	
it	is	thus	very	important	to	consider,	for	instance,	what	kinds	of	policies	should	be	
developed	 to	counter	 the	 legal	 strategy	of	 the	dominant	agents	of	 the	market	
to	create	an	atmosphere	of	fear,	Uncertainty	and	Doubt	(fUD)	to	destabilize	the	
adoption	of	fLOSS.177	The	techniques	of	claiming	that	fLOSS	licenses	are	invalid,	
suing	for	software	patent	infringement,	and	threatening	to	sue	governments	with	
a	legacy	of	pirate	systems	if	they	move	towards	less	restrictive	schemes	are	some	
of	the	various	strategies	that	proprietary	vendors	have	used	to	create	a	negative	
atmosphere	for	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	as	a	public	policy.	The	same	goes	with	the	
introduction	of	models	that	seek	to	inculcate	an	inaccurate	semblance	of	freedom	
and	hence	generate	confusion	in	a	normative	order	for	whose	functioning	the	role	
of	instruments	like	the	general	Public	License	is	of	so	fundamental	importance.
Second,	we	should	also	ponder	on	what	attitudes	could	be	expected	from	
law	with	 respect	 to	 the	 inherent	emotionalism of	fLOSS	communities.	 Strongly	
subject	to	inflamed	disagreements,	communities	of	fLOSS	developers	are	always	
on	 the	 verge	 of	 forking.	 forking,	 as	 defined	 in	 the	wikipedia,	 happens	 “when	
developers	 take	 a	 copy	 of	 source	 code	 from	 one	 software	 package	 and	 start	
independent	development	on	 it,	 creating	 a	distinct	piece	of	 software.”178	 even	
though	it	is	a	common	occurrence,	forking	is	considered	to	be	a	negative	event,	
since	it	results	in	lost	time,	energy	and,	in	some	cases,	money.	hence,	also	in	this	
respect	a	public	policy	which	seeks	 to	approximate	 law	and	 the	state	 from	the	
emotions	experienced	in	a	contemporary	society	could	prove	to	be	of	particular	
interest	to	the	development	of	fLOSS	communities,	and	thus	to	the	preservation	
of	the	same	beneficial	(and	democratic)	values	that	justify	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	
by	the	state.
176.	 Posner,	“Law	and	the	Emotions,”	supra	note	174	at	p.	1981.
177.	 See	Andrés	Guadamuz	González,	“Legal	Challenges	to	Open	Source	Licenses,”	(2005)	2:2	SCRIPT-ed Journal 
of Law & Technology	257–264,	<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script%2Ded/vol2-2/challenges.doc>.
178.	 “Fork	(software	development),”	in	Wikipedia	(17	January	2007),	<	http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.
php?title=Fork_(software_development)&oldid=101299505>.	
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Problems	related	to	the	first	question could	be	addressed	by	means	of	a	
clear	mandatory	framework	with	respect	to	fLOSS	use	by	governments,	with	legal	
safe-harbours	 that	protect	 users	 from	badly	 intentioned	 campaigns	of	 software	
monopolies,	and	campaigns	that	 inform	“uninformed	users	about	the	existence	
and	 the	characteristics	of	 [fLOSS],”179	as	well	as	about	 the	 inaccuracies	of	fUD	
techniques	of	propaganda.	Problems	related	to	the	second	could	be	addressed	
through	procurement	processes	that	require	fLOSS	projects	to	commit	a	group	of	
developers	to	participate	for	a	certain	period	of	time,	through	economic	incentives	
conditional	on	that	requirement	or	through	material	or	organizational	 incentives	
for	the	professionalization	of	fLOSS	communities.
	
5.4. FLOSS and an Open Political Democracy
The	third	dimension	of	fLOSS,	which	could	support	the	justification	of	its	adoption	
by	governments	under	the	democratic	principle,	is	easier	to	understand,	even	for	
those	who	do	not	adopt	a	very	extensive	conception	of	democracy—that	is	to	
say,	it	would	justify	fLOSS	adoption	even	for	those	who	restrict	the	democratic	
principle	to	its	formal	expression.	in	such	a	dimension,	it	will	be	argued,	fLOSS	
can	be	understood	as	 a	decisive	political	 instrument	within	 the	boundaries	of	
traditional	conceptions	of	citizenship	itself.
	 Open	source	code	renders	possible	an	amplified	participation	of	citizens	
in	 the	 universe	 of	 decisions	 relative	 to	 the	polis.	 By	 having	 the	 possibility,	 by	
themselves	or	by	others	on	their	behalf,	to	know	what	the	code	that	runs	within	
their	governments’	computers	says,	citizens	can	have	access	to	the	infrastructure	
that	determines	how	their	governments	work,	to	the	architecture	that	defines	the	
way	by	which	several	actions that	have	important	implications	on	their	lives	will	
be	carried	out.	whether	we	should	regulate	code	to	be	open	also	 in	relations	
that	take	place	exclusively	in	the	market	is,	of	course,	a	very	important	issue,	as	
the	power	of	markets	increases	so	as	to	equal	or	supplant	the	power	that	many	
governments	 have.	 however,	 this	 would	 exceed	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 analysis.180	
with	 respect	 to	 the	code	 that	 runs	 in	 the	computers	of	our	governments,	 the	
argument	here	is	that	its	development	and	licensing	should	be	agreed	to	in	ways	
that	provide	citizens	with	wider	possibilities	of	control	and	thus	of	participation	
in	 the	 formal	 structure	 of	 the	 political	 process.	 Under	 the	 open	 government	
principle,	transparency	must	be	the	rule,	and	opacity	the	exception.	Be	it	with	
respect	to	the	code	that	runs	in	polling	machines	or	in	electronic	procurement	
systems,	 or	with	 respect	 to	 dozens	 of	 other	 critical	 or	 ordinary	 governmental	
software	applications,	citizens	have	the	right	to	know	which	instructions	comprise	
the	ghost	in	the	machine.
	 it	 is	 important,	 therefore,	 to	understand	that	 if	one	accepts	 that	code	
has	equivalent	properties	to	law,	since	it	determines	the	way	assorted	relations	
are	established,	modified	or	extinguished,	then	law	must	be	accessible	to	those	
affected	by	its	commands.	as	Lawrence	Lessig	argues,	“‘free	software’—or	‘open	
source	software’	[...]—is	itself	a	check	on	arbitrary	power,”	“a	structural	guarantee	
179.	 Stefano	Comino	and	Fabio	M.	Manenti,	“Free/Open	Source	vs	Closed	Source	Software:	Public	Policies	in	
the	Software	Market,”	(July	2004),	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=469741>	at	p.	1.
180.	 An	interesting	question	could	be	raised,	for	instance,	with	respect	to	whether	corporate	governance	
regulations	could	have	any	say	on	the	choice	amongst	different	models	of	licensing.
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of	constitutionalized	liberty.”181	“[O]pen	code	reduces	the	reward	from	burying	
regulation	 in	 the	hidden	 spaces	of	 code.	 it	 functions	as	a	kind	of	freedom	of	
information	act	for	network	regulation.	as	with	ordinary	law,	open	code	requires	
that	 lawmaking	be	public,	and	thus	that	 lawmaking	be	transparent.	 [...]	 [O]pen	
code	 is	 a	 foundation	 to	 an	 open	 society.”182	 hence,	 “[i]f	 code	 is	 a	 lawmaker,	
then	it	should	embrace	the	values	of	a	particular	kind	of	lawmaking.	The	core	of	
these	values	is	transparency.	what	a	code	regulation	does	should	be	at	least	as	
apparent	as	what	a	legal	regulation	does.”183	Lessig	states	even	more	clearly:
i’ve	 argued	 for	 transparent	 code	 because	 of	 the	 constitutional values it 
embeds.	 i	have	not	argued	against	code	as	regulator	or	against	regulation.	
But	 i	have	argued	 that	we	 insist	on	 transparency	 in	 regulation	and	 that	we	
push	code	structures	to	enhance	that	transparency.	
The	law	presently	does	not	do	this.	[…]	The	law	prefers	opaque	to	transparent	
code;	it	constructs	incentives	to	hide	code	rather	than	to	make	its	functionality	
obvious.184
	 Likewise,	in	the	recent	The Wealth of Networks,	yochai	Benkler	presents	
several	arguments	in	support	of	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	by	states,	including	that	
fLOSS	promotes:
the	value of transparency	of	software	used	for	public	purposes.	[…]	The	basic	
thrust	 of	 these	 arguments,	 […]	 is	 that	 free	 software	 makes	 it	 possible	 for	
constituents	 to	monitor	 the	behavior	of	machines	 used	 in	governments,	 to	
make	sure	that	they	are	designed	to	do	what	they	are	publicly	reported	to	do.	
The	most	significant	manifestation	of	this	sentiment	in	the	United	States	is	the	
hitherto	 unsuccessful,	 but	 fairly	 persistent	 effort	 to	 require	 states	 to	 utilize	
voting	machines	 that	 use	 free	 software,	 or	 at	 a	minimum,	 to	 use	 software	
whose	source	code	is	open	for	public	inspection.185
	 The	open	government	principle,	 inherent	 to	 the	democratic	principle,	
very	clearly	identifies	that	whenever	governments	have	the	possibility	to	contract 
in	 a	 way	 that	 preserves	 the	 openness	 of	 computer	 source	 code,	 there	 is	 no	
justification	 for	 not	 doing	 so.	 Still,	 it	 makes	 one	 question	 how	 governments	
should	proceed	when	there	 is	no	available	software	 licensed	within	the	fLOSS	
model:	 should	 governments	 contract	 proprietary	 software	 or	 should	 they	
develop	 their	own	solution?	The	creation	of	an	 international	pool	of	 software,	
building	upon	the	database	jointly	maintained	today	by	UneScO	and	the	free	
Software	foundation,	could	prove	 to	be	an	 important	policy	 to	address	 those	
kinds	of	situations	by	increasing	coordination	between,	and	avoiding	duplication	
of,	efforts	by	national	states.
	
181.	 Lessig,	Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, supra	note	133	at	p.	7.
182.	 Lessig,	Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, supra	note	133	at	p.	108.
183.	 Lessig,	Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, supra	note	133	at	p.	224.
184.	 Lessig,	Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, supra	note	133	at	p.	225	(emphasis	added).
185.	 Benkler,	The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale	University	
Press,	2006),	<http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf>	at	p.	322	(emphasis	added).
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5.5. FLOSS and Economic Democracy
from	a	limited	perspective,	one	could	identify	the	immediate	aspect	of	economic	
savings	as	the	single	important	point	of	convergence	between	the	adoption	of	
fLOSS	and	the	democratic	principle.	after	all,	by	saving	money	that	otherwise	
would	 be	 put	 toward	 the	 costs	 of	 expensive	 software	 licenses,	 governments	
will	be	able	to	spend	the	same	amount	more	wisely	on	social	projects	targeted	
towards	the	inclusion	of	their	citizens	in	the	information	age,	thereby	promoting	
the	 development	 of	 their	 economies	 in	 a	 continuous	 and	 cyclical	 process	 of	
autonomy.	This	was	precisely	what	happened	with	 the	poor	Spanish	 region	of	
extremadura,	as	noted	above.
	 On	 a	 wider	 scale,	 however,	 the	 adoption	 of	 fLOSS	 should	 also	 be	
envisaged	 as	 a	 means	 of	 “democratizing	 innovation,”	 as	 argued	 by	 eric	 von	
hippel.	as	he	explains,	“it	 is	 important	 to	ask	about	 the	social	welfare	effects	
of	 innovation	by	 users”	 [...]	 because	 “social	welfare	 is	 likely	 to	be	 higher	 in	 a	
world	in	which	both	users	and	manufacturers	innovate.”186	The	fLOSS	movement	
would	promote	these	effects	because	its	“communities	do	not	allow	contributing	
innovators	 to	 […]	 control	 the	 use	 of	 their	 code.	 instead,	 contributors	 use	
their	authors’	copyright	 to	assign	their	code	to	a	common	pool	 to	which	all—
contributors	and	non-contributors	alike—are	granted	equal	access.”187	in	such	an	
innovation	process,	“[a]s	lead	users	develop	and	test	their	solutions	in	their	own	
use	environments,	 they	 learn	more	about	 the	 real	nature	of	 their	needs.	They	
then	often	 freely	 reveal	 information	 about	 their	 innovations.	Other	 users	 then	
may	adopt	the	innovations,	comment	on	them,	modify	and	improve	them,	and	
freely	reveal	what	they	have	done	in	turn.”188	in	a	system	like	this,	the	economic	
outcomes	are	 likely	 to	be	higher	 than	 in	a	 restrictive	 system;	but	even	 if	 they	
are	 not,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 shared	 by	 a	 greater	 number	 of	 innovators.	 The	
commons-based	 peer-production	model,	 thus,	 allows	more	 people	 to	 benefit	
from	the	outcomes	of	societal	development.	
	 in	 “The	 Many	 aspects	 of	 Open	 Source	 Software,”	 the	 european	
commission’s	 interoperable	 Delivery	 of	 european	 egovernment	 Services	
to	 Public	 administrations,	 Businesses	 and	 citizens	 (iDaBc)	 discusses	 the	
importance	of	stimulating	a	digital	heritage,	given	that	every	society	is	standing	
on	the	shoulders	of	previous	generations.	The	iDaBc	examines	how	the	fLOSS	
movement	would	 contribute	 to	 this	 process	 by	 constituting	 a	 natural	 pool	 of	
knowledge	and	expertise,	where	“new	generations	of	people	 can	 freely	build	
upon	that	knowledge	to	create	new	and	innovative	solutions	for	new	problems.”189	
The	 document	 also	 addresses	 the	 peer-review	process	where	 “many	 different	
people	and	organizations	look	at	the	software	from	a	different	perspective”	as	
a	means	of	stimulating	innovation	at	a	“global	spreading	and	fast	development	
pace,	[which]	makes	OSS	more	innovative	than	closed	software.”190
186.	 Eric	von	Hippel,	Democratizing Innovation	(MIT	Press,	2005),	<http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/books.
htm>	at	p.	107.
187.	 von	Hippel,	Democratizing Innovation,	supra	note	186	at	p.	113.
188.	 von	Hippel,	Democratizing Innovation,	supra	note	186	at	p.	109.
189.	 IDABC	European	eGovernment	Services,	Open	Source	Observatory,	“The	Many	Aspects	of	Open	Source	
Software,”	supra	note	67.
190.	 IDABC	European	eGovernment	Services,	Open	Source	Observatory,	“The	Many	Aspects	of	Open	Source	
Software,”	supra	note	67.
	 Software	Procurement	under	the	Democratic	Principle	 121(2008)	5:1&2	UOLTJ	79
	 in	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Lessig	 argues	 that	opening	 the	 code	of	government	
computers	is	important	to	the	development	of	an	ecosystem	where	people	and	
governments	are	free	to	develop	code	however	they	wish	and	to	improve	upon	
prior	developments.	he	argues:
if	the	federal	government	develops	a	system	to	handle	welfare	claims,	what	
reason	does	it	have	for	hiding	the	code	for	that	system	from	the	states?	why	
not	let	the	states	take	that	code	and	build	upon	it?	and	if	the	states,	then	so,	
too,	with	the	universities.	in	each	case,	the	aim	should	be	to	expand	the	reach	
of	 these	powerful	 and	 valuable	 resources,	 not	 to	 contract	 and	hoard	 them	
when	no	value	to	the	hoarding	exists.191	
especially	in	the	context	of	developing	countries,	as	Benkler	notes,	fLOSS	may	
work	as	an	instrument	to	transfer	technology,	“with	the	potential	of	local	software	
programmers	to	learn	the	program,	acquire	skills,	and	therefore	easily	enter	the	
global	market	with	services	and	applications	for	free	software.”192
*
6. COnCLuSIOn
In tunIs, the world decIded to embrace	a	neutral	approach	with	 respect	 to	
fLOSS	adoption	by	governments.	after	pressure	from	the	US	delegation,193	the	
Tunis	commitment	limited	itself	to	registering	the	conviction	that:
governments,	 the	 private	 sector,	 civil	 society,	 the	 scientific	 and	 academic	
community,	and	users	can utilize various technologies and licensing models,	
including	those	developed	under	proprietary	schemes	and	those	developed	
under	open-source	and	free	modalities,	in	accordance	with	their	interests	and	
with	the	need	to	have	reliable	services	and	implement	effective	programmes	
for	their	people.194
	 The	above	wording	can	be	interpreted	in	two	different	ways:	either	as	a	
commandment	for	non-discrimination,	whereby	the	commitment	would	prescribe	
that	mandatory	provisions	on	behalf	of	fLOSS	should	be	avoided,	or	merely	as	
a	blank	rule	that	leaves	room	for	each	country	to	decide	internally	about	fLOSS.	
On	one	hand,	 the	 second	 interpretation	may	 seem	more	 likely,	 otherwise	 the	
reference	to	“in	accordance	with	their	 interests”	would	not	make	sense.195	On	
the	other	hand,	the	fulfilment	of	such	a	rule	to	meet	the	democratic	principle,	as	
advocated	in	this	paper,	would	lead	to	the	natural	understanding	that	adopting	
fLOSS	is	not	an	option,	but	a	duty.	
191.	 Lessig,	The Future of Ideas,	supra	note	20	at	p.	247.
192.	 Benkler,	The Wealth of Networks, supra	note	185	at	p.	321.
193.	 William	New,	“Open	Source	Agreed	in	UN	Information	Society	Summit	Preparations,”	blog	posting	to	
Intellectual Property Watch	(10	October	2005),	<http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=98>.
194.	 United	Nations,	Internet	Telecommunications	Union,	WSIS, Tunis Commitment,	supra	note	126	at	para.	29	
(emphasis	added).
195.	 Though	governments	can	utilize	both	licensing	models,	in	some	concrete	moments	they	must	choose	one	
or	the	other.	In	doing	so,	they	will	pursue	the	particular	interests	of	their	people.	In	such	a	process,	nothing	
seems	to	prevent	anticipatorily	having	a	general	rule	that	mandates	the	adoption	of	FLOSS	applied	to	every	
future	case.
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	 This	imperative	would	hold	even	for	those	countries	that	resist	a	broad	
interpretation	of	the	democratic	principle and	seek	to	limit	the	idea	of	democracy	
to	 its	 formal	 expression.	 as	 argued	 above,	 even	 the	 political	 and	 structural	
dimension	of	the	democratic	principle	would	justify	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	as	a	
means	of	promoting	citizen	participation	in	government	decisions.	nonetheless,	
as	Maria	eduarda	gonçalves	observes	in	Direito da Informação	[Information Law]		
there	 is	 no	 contemporary	democracy	 that	 limits	 itself	 to	 recognizing	 a	merely	
formal	expression	of	the	democratic	principle.	in	her	words:
no	 system	 will	 refrain	 [...]	 to	 establish	 the	 commitments	 considered	 as	
adequate	between	the	exercise	of	individual	freedoms	and	rights,	and	their	
regulation	and	control	 in	 the	name	of	 the	general	 interest.	even	the	 liberal	
legal-economic	 systems,	 favourable	 to	 the	 free	 labour	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 the	
market,	admit	that	the	State	must	intervene	in	the	creation	of	the	conditions	
[...]	that	render	possible,	namely,	a general and equitable access to the means 
of communication and to the necessary sources of information for the 
accomplishment of the rights of the person.196
it	 seems,	 thus,	 that	 the	 rule	 framed	 in	 the	 Tunis	 commitment	 would	 not	
resist	a	more	 in-depth	assessment	of	 its	validity	with	 respect	 to	any	system	of	
constitutional	rights	in	western	democracies.
	 This	paper	had	as	its	central	purpose	the	development	of	a	normative	
framework	 for	 investigating	 whether	 under	 the	 democratic	 principle a	
governmental	 duty	 to	 embrace	 the	 principles	 present	 in	 the	 free/Libre/Open	
Source	Software	movement	exists.	The	point	of	departure	was	an	explanation	
of	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 movements	 (free	 software	 and	 open	 source),	
gathered	under	the	general	 idea	of	fLOSS.	The	article	then	sought	to	portray	
in	a	snapshot	the	current	stage	of	national	and	regional	policies	with	respect	to	
the	adoption	of	rules	or	guidelines	for	the	procurement	of	software,	as	well	as	
investigating	whether	specified	countries	were	following,	to	a	smaller	or	larger	
extent,	any	strategy	for	implementing	fLOSS.	
	 The	 conclusion	 was	 that	 many	 countries,	 even	 those	 that	 have	 not	
mandated	 the	 adoption	 of	 fLOSS	 (meaning	most	 of	 them),	 were	 following	 a	
movement	to	implement	fLOSS	that	rarely	relied	upon	purely	objective	factors.	
That	 is	 to	 say,	normative	and	 ideological	 factors	were	 identified	as	playing	an	
important	role	in	the	process	and,	it	was	argued	with	particular	reference	to	Brazil,	
those	are	associated	with	democratic	ideology.	The	article	then	explained	how	
the	democratic	principle	 has	 evolved	 from	a	 formal	 and	 structural	 conception	
towards	 a	 substantive dimension,	which	 inclusively	 is	 not	 sensed	purely	 in	 the	
relations	 between	 individuals	 and	 the	 state,	 but	 in	 all	 the	 realms	 of	 societal	
life.	That	 is	to	say,	 i	showed	how	the	democratic	principle	has	been	subject	to	
a	 reconciliation	 between	 the	 old	 values	 of	 classic	 liberal	 democracy	 and	 the	
renewed	values	of	social	justice.
	 The	 discussion	 then	 turned	 to	 establishing	 a	 justification	 for	 the	
adoption	 of	 fLOSS	 with	 respect	 to	 different	 dimensions	 of	 the	 democratic	
196.	 Maria	Eduarda	Gonçalves,	Direito da Informação: novos direitos e formas de regula.ção na Sociedade da 
Informação	(Almedina,	2003)	at	pp.	24-25	(author’s	translation)	(emphasis	added).	
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principle.	i	argued	that	the	adoption	of	fLOSS	principles	should	be	understood	
as	essential	for	the	establishment	of	a	cultural	or	semiotic	democracy,	where	it	
is	possible	for	people	to	take	part	in	the	construction	of	the	signs	that	define	
their	own	sources	of	meaning	and	experience.	Second,	i	identified	the	fLOSS	
movement	with	a	particular	contemporary	ethic,	which	himanen	 identified	as	
“the	hacker	ethic,”	and	argued	that	in	a	democratic	system	law	must	correspond	
to	 the	 shared	 values	 of	 a	 given	 society.	 Third,	 i	 examined	 the	 intertwining	
between	fLOSS	and	the	traditional	concept	of	a	political	democracy,	arguing	
that	 a	 contemporary	 understanding	 of	 the	 open	 government	 principle	must	
include	the	disclosure	of	the	code	of	the	computer	programs	run	by	the	state.	
finally,	 i	argued	that	the	adoption	of	a	fLOSS	policy	by	the	state	is	essential	
for	 democratizing	 the	 possibilities	 of	 innovation	 and	 that	 those	 effects	must	
also	be	extended	towards	the	international	stage	to	maximize	the	potential	for	
emerging	economies’	technological	development.
	 i	 conclude	 by	 emphasizing	 again	 that	 there	 is	 a	 moral	 duty	 of	 any	
democratic	 state	 to	 adopt	 a	 contractual	model	which	 preserves	more	 rights	
to	 the	government	 and	 to	 its	 citizens.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 not	 acceptable	 to	
think	that	states	can	merely	adhere	to	restrictive	end	User	License	agreements	
as	predetermined	by	monopolist	companies	without	pondering	more	carefully	
about	 the	 content	 and	 the	 clauses	 inserted	 into	 those	 instruments.	Between	
two	different	models	of	contracting	software,	a	state	must	adopt	the	one	that	
fits	better	 into	 its	particular	conception	of	democracy.	nonetheless,	 i	am	not	
arguing	here	in	favour	of	a	particular	license.	even	though	my	sense	is	that	the	
copyleft	clause	is	essential	to	maintaining	fLOSS	always	under	the	same	regime	
of	freedom,	thus	reflecting	the	perception	of	a	morality	of	duty	as	identified	by	
fuller,	 i	 am	not	defending	any	particular	 license	as	 invulnerable	and	perfect.	
The	evolution	of	the	system	must	and	will	certainly	be	carried	out	by	its	agents.	
what	is	only	known	for	sure	is	that	we	should	embrace	its	democratic	promise.
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